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PROLOGUE
This is a true story. It is the story of how the law punished a man
for speaking about his legal rights; of how, after punishing him, it
silenced him; of how, when he did speak, he was not heard. This
pervasive and awful oppression was subtle and, in a real way,
largely unintentional. I know because I was one of his oppressors.
I was his lawyer.
Earlier drafts of this Article began with the above somewhat
melodramatic and self-flagellating words. Although I still hope that
the story you are about to read is true, I no longer wish to begin by
asserting its meaning. Instead, I strive to present this story in a
form that you can interpret yourself, and in so doing, to exemplify a
method for both studying and changing the practice of law.
In a recent article, Lucie White points out that the word "cli-
ent" derives from the Latin verb "cluere," meaning "to be named,
hear oneself named." In ancient Rome, persons under the pa-
tronage of patricians were called "clientem" because they were
known by the name of their patron.' White explains that because,
even for the most enlightened modem day lawyers, "advocacy is a
practice of speaking for [the client,] ... the advocate ... inevitably
replays the drama of subordination in her own work."2 The story
told below shows how powerful the forces of such client subordina-
tion can be despite a lawyer's conscious intent and efforts, but the
Article as a whole also strives to offer some hope against White's
word "inevitably." I offer the metaphor of the lawyer as translator
as a way of both understanding and altering the ways lawyers change
the meanings of their clients' stories. By implying that law is a lan-
guage foreign to the client, the metaphor suggests that the meaning
of the client's story will "inevitably" be transformed through the
lawyer's representation; no sentence can be perfectly translated
from one language to another.3 Yet if one feels a sense of loss in
speaking through a translator, there can also be something gained.
1 Lucie E. White, Goldberg v. Kelly on the Paradox of Lawyeringfor the Poor, 56
BROOK. L. REV. 861, 861 n.2 (1990) [hereinafter Paradox of Lawyering].
2 Id. at 861.
3 By stressing the inevitability of meaning change, the translation metaphor sug-
gests, for example, that the interviewing techniques advocated in the influential texts
authored by David Binder and his colleagues at UCLA, see DAVID BINDER & PRICE,
LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING: A CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH (1977); DAVID
BINDER, ET AL., LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS: A CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH (1991),
although valuable, may not be sufficient to assure that the case constructed by the lawyer
continues to be the client's "own story" in a way that is meaningful for the client. See
infra note 159. For differing assessments of the limitations of the "client-centered"
model of lawyering, see Anthony V. Alfieri, The Politics of Clinical Knowledge, 35 N.Y.L.
SCHOOL REV. 7 (1990); Robert Dinerstein, Client-Centered Counseling: Reappraisal and Re-
finement, 32 ARiz L. REV. 501 (1990); Robert Dinerstein, "Clinical Texts and Contexts," 39
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By speaking through a translator, one can be heard and understood
in places where otherwise one is mute. The translator does not si-
lence the speaker but rather seeks to enhance the speaker's voice by
adding her own. The good translator does not alter the speaker's
meaning without the speaker's consent, and may even collaborate
with the speaker to produce a statement in the foreign language that
is more meaningful than the speaker's original utterance. Thus,
translation offers both an image of the constraints upon a lawyer's
ability to represent fully his client's story and a model for recogniz-
ing and managing the inevitable changes in meaning in a way that
may empower rather than subjugate the client.4
More than ten years ago, William Felstiner, Richard Abel, and
Austin Sarat pointed out the need to study the process by which
disputes are transformed from a layperson's initial sense of injury
into legal claims, and noted the dearth of empirical research and
scholarly attention to this issue.5 Legal scholarship that begins with
a court's written opinion or even that (all too rarely) delves back to
the complaint filed at the outset of litigation misses entirely this crit-
ical transformation process. Yet we know that the vast majority of
lawsuits filed are resolved without a court decision on the merits and
that an even larger number of disputes are handled by lawyers with-
out ever utilizing litigation.6 The ways lawyers transform their cli-
ents' stories into legal terms are the most profoundly important
ways that the legal system has effect; yet these transformations have
been largely invisible to and unstudied by the legal academy.
What scholarship exists, almost all very recent, provides troub-
ling reports. 7 Works by Tony Alfieri, Gerald Lopez, and Lucie
White on poverty and civil rights practice-drawing primarily on
their own experiences in these fields-conclude that lawyers rou-
tinely silence and subordinate their clients while purporting to tell
UCLA L. REV. 697 (1992); and William Simon, Homo Psychologicus: Notes on a New Legal
Formalism, 32 STAN. L. REV. 487 (1980).
4 Of course, client subordination is caused by many other factors than the problem
of "translation" nor will better translation by itself necessarily empower most clients.
The translation metaphor is offered to supplement, not supplant, other critiques and
models oflawyering. It is interesting to note, however, that even one of the most promi-
nent advocates of a radical reconception of lawyering, Gerald Lopez, views "translation"
as a necessary aspect of any effort (even by a non-lawyer) to help another person solve a
problem. Gerald Lopez, Lay Lawyering, 32 UCLA L. REV. 1, 9-14 (1984).
5 William L.F. Felstiner et al., The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes: Naming,
Blaming, Claiming.... 15 LAw & Soc'y REV. 631 (1980).
6 See Marc Galanter, Justice in Many Rooms: Courts, Private Ordering, and Indigenous
Law, 19J. LEGAL PLURALISM 1, 11-13 (1981).
7 A good, brief survey of the empirical literature on attorney-client relations ap-
pears in the article by William L.F. Felstiner and Austin Sarat in this symposium issue.
See William L.F. Felstiner & Austin Sarat, Enactments of Power: Negotiating Reality and Re-
sponsibility in Lawyer-Client Interactions, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1447, 1454-58 (1992).
[Vol. 77:12981300
LA WYER AS TRANSLATOR
"their" stories.8 Although these writers tend to emphasize the role
of gender, race, and class in such client subordination, the news
from other fronts is no better. Felstiner and Sarat have concluded
from an extensive empirical study of divorce cases-in which lawyer
and client often share the same race, gender, and class features-
that "clients largely talk past their lawyers" and that the lawyer's
interpretation takes place without a shared understanding.9 The an-
thropologist-lawyer team of William O'Barr and John Conley con-
cludes from its studies of legal discourse that "the law has come to
define the problems of ordinary people in ways that may have little
meaning for them, and to offer remedies that are unresponsive to
their needs as they see them." 10 Significantly, research consistently
shows that people who have been involved with the American legal
system have a more negative view of it than those who have not."
Litigant discontent is pervasive and notably independent of out-
come; "winners" are as critical as "losers."' 2
In using the metaphor of lawyering as translation, this Article
suggests that one can understand at least some of the silencing of
the client's voice as the lawyer's failure to recognize and implement
the art and ethic of the good translator-a translator who shows
conscious awareness of shifts in meaning and who collaborates with
the speaker in managing these changes. It also suggests a method-
ology, drawn from anthropology and sociolinguistics, for making a
lawyer aware of how meaning is changing and for revealing the com-
plex significances of the story to be translated. This methodology,
termed the ethnography of legal discourse, begins by recording as
much as possible of what takes place during the representation of a
8 Anthony V. Alfieri, Reconciling Poverty Law Practice: Learning Lessons of Client Narra-
tive, 100 YALE L.J. 2107 (1991); Anthony V. Alfieri, Speaking Out of Turn: The Story of
Josephine V, 4 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics 619 (1991) [hereinafter Speaking Out of Turn];
Anthony V. Alfieri, The Antimonies of Poverty Law and a Theory of Dialogic Empowerment, 16
N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 659 (1987-1988); Gerald P. Lopez, Reconceiving Civil
Rights Practice: Seven Weeks in the Life of a Rebellious Collaboration, 77 GEO. L.J. 1603 (1989);
Paradox of Lawyering, supra note 1; Lucie E. White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills,
and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. G., 38 BUFF. L. REV. 1 (1990) [hereinafter
Sunday Shoes].
9 Austin Sarat & William L.F. Felstiner, Law and Social Relations: Vocabularies of Mo-
tive in Lawyer/Client Interaction, 22 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 737, 742 (1988) [hereinafter Sarat &
Felstiner, Vocabularies of Motive].
10 JOHN M. CONLEY & WILLIAM M. O'BARR, RULES VERSUS RELATIONSHIPS: THE
ETHNOGRAPHY OF LEGAL DISCOURSE 177 (1990).
11 Austin W. Sarat & William L.F. Felstiner, Lawyers and Legal Consciousness: Law Talk
in the Divorce Lawyer's Office, 98 YALE L.J. 1663, 1687 (1989).
12 See Tom R. Tyler, Client Perceptions of Litigation, 24 TRIAL 40 (1988); see also ToM R.
TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 178 (1990) ("In evaluating the justice of their exper-
iences [people] consider factors unrelated to outcome, such as whether they have had a
chance to state their case and been treated with dignity and respect.").
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client.13 These records are then treated as texts which are given
close and repeated reading with the goal of evoking the significance
of what was said and done from the standpoint of each participant
and, particularly, from the viewpoint of the client. The resulting in-
terpretation is generated through a collective process, perhaps with
colleagues and, most importantly, with the client herself. The expe-
rience of anthropologists, sociologists, and linguists with similar
methodologies suggests that this approach can be an effective way
of recognizing the difference of "the other" and expanding imagina-
tion sufficiently to have some understanding of the other's story.' 4
In Part I I tell the story of one case I personally handled, and
include many verbatim texts of what was actually written and said.
While representing this client, I consciously strove to emulate the
translator's art and ethic, with decidedly mixed results. In Part II I
further explicate the metaphor of lawyering as translation, and in
Part III I summarize the theory and practice of ethnographic de-
scription of legal discourse. In Part IV I apply the translation meta-
phor and ethnographic methods to the texts that appear in Part I,
and in Part V I share my client's comments on the case as a whole
and on my interpretations of what happened. I hope to recreate for
you my own experience of growing understanding as it developed
through use of the translation metaphor and the methods of
ethnography.
13 In order of preference, forms of recording are videotaping, audiotaping, verba-
tim transcripts, comtemporaneous notes, accounts written soon after the event, and
more distant written recollections checked against other persons present at the time.
As explained infra notes 245-46 and accompanying text, my client has consented to
the use of his real name and to the disclosure of confidential attorney-client communica-
tions in this Article. I have also used the real names of the arresting police officers and
the trial judge, and reproduce in figures 1 and 2 actual court and police documents.
14 By preserving the integrity of the client's own words in texts that are studied and
by including the client in the interpretation of those words, the ethnographic method
hopefully de-centers the lawyer and strips him of some of the power that may blind and
deafen him. Feminist and critical race theorists suggest that those who have personally
experienced disempowerment and marginalization can attain a "multiple conscious-
ness" that enables them to imagine other kinds of marginalized viewpoints. See Richard
Delgado, When a Story is Just a Story, 76 VA. L. REV. 95 (1990); Richard Delgado, Story-
telling for Oppositionists and Others, 87 MIcH. L. REV. 2411, 2414 (1989) [hereinafter Del-
gado, Storytelling]; Mari J. Matsuda, When the First Quail Calls: Multiple Consciousness as
Jurisprudential Method, 11 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 7 (1989). In a more modest way that
hopefully guards against what Delgado and Stefanic term the "empathic fallacy," Rich-
ard Delgado &Jean Stefancic, Images of the Outsider in American Law and Culture: Can Free
Expression Remedy Systemic Social Ills?, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1258, 1261 (1992), the ethno-
graphic method may provide a similar insight into the worldview of those situated very
differently, a way of responding to the postmodern concern with being trapped within
one's own subjectivity.
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THE CASE OF THE ATTITUDE PROBLEM
A. The Beginning
This story begins with a sentence of deceptive simplicity, con-
tained within the complaint in a misdemeanor case:
FIGURE 1
.4 Br1s. & CO. katamrazoo. M 49-1
0,rtyd. SCAO .J O.Ia~csI Coool ."Orta .'Ww~lnt. Court 2,,d CoamoI.It sory P~oosrato,3r d Comooralorr Ototdlor
STATE OF MICHIGAN
14B JUDICIAL DISTRICT
JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
coMPLAINT
MISDEMEANOR1
CASE NO.
Uisti[ct Court Or: Court address .. i rrlrjl'.r tar
THE PEOPLE OF Otre.du.t -r. d,. dlr- Vir-rr. nrnrr,,nr.
O The State of Michigan v H. DUJJor JOHNSON ,,,,,,,;r,.-i| | kompol t8JIEz o
0___ informatioh & belief
Co-defendanth) Oar. Oa ; 7hi
____/_9-5-88
ChIyITrr., ". r Co .-. r.. . bare..r... CTN Ii1."-i,.i ... S I ...... rrHewitt at Washtenaw. Ypsilanti Twp. Washtehai 
- I 4-25-59
Police asency rroorr no cl-ne Mr,,:rrp-..
4901-88 DISTURBING THE PEACE 90.days and/or $100
Witrsr
STATE OF MICHIGAN, COUNTY OF
The comlplaining witire.s lys that on the date and at the locatidrr desciljd. the drli.lii,rtrrl Ir h, I rw;.
did make or excite a disturbance in a business place, located at Hewitt e  a:asltenatt;
contrary to IICL 750.170; NSA 28.367; [750.170]
I'
The complaining witness asks that deferdant be apprehended and dealt with according to law.
• . ea Officers only) I decldre under penalties of pejury th #fi*itetlitIh1 '- hre trug d'the best 61 my
Information, knowledge and belief.
Warrant authorized on ty Com rr  Withersnt ' t ra
or. Subhtcrlbedand worn tobeforemeon . - .
n-oomorarrlnal Crotll " signru|
oc22K o ?i CnMPLAINT MISCIEMEAN09
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The defendant named in this complaint, M. DujonJohnson, was
arraigned in a district court' 5 in Washtenaw County, where the Uni-
versity of Michigan is located. The county seat is Ann Arbor, a
wealthy and sophisticated college town located about 40 miles west
of Detroit. The other major town in the county is Ypsilanti, a more
working-class community with a substantial African-American popu-
lation. This district court serves Ypsilanti Township, a fairly rural
area adjacent to Ypsilanti marked by pockets of suburban
encroachment.
Johnson asked for court-appointed counsel because of his lim-
ited income. The General Clinic at the University of Michigan Law
School was appointed to represent him. At the time, I was one of
two clinical professors who taught the General Clinic. The case was
assigned to a team of two student attorneys, and I was their super-
vising attorney.
B. The Police Report
Apart from the rather uninformative misdemeanor complaint,
the first information we received about this case came from the po-
lice incident report,1 6 which we obtained before the initial client in-
terview. The report, reprinted below verbatim, was signed and
apparently authored by Michigan State Trooper Wayne Kiser. The
abbreviation which appears throughout as "U/S" ("undersigned")
sometimes refers to both Kiser and his partner, Trooper Frank
Mraz, and sometimes only to Kiser.
15 In the Michigan court system, the district court is the lowest court of record, with
jurisdiction over misdemeanors and civil cases in which the amount in controversy is less
than $10,000. MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27A.8301, 27A.8311 (1987). Populous counties are
typically divided into several districts, with a separate court for each district. Id.
§ 27A.8101; § 27A.8120(2) (creating district court for Ypsilanti Township).
16 WAYNE KISER & FRANK MRAZ, MICHIGAN DEP'T OF STATE POLICE, ORIGINAL INCI-
DENT REP. No. 026-4901-88 (1988) [hereinafter POLICE REPORT].
CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 77:1298
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FIGURE 2
qgAL INCIDENT
SEP OS. i9DB '6 i- ~
vi° ; C....0-0-
SPYPSILANTI #2S TASHTEHAW
TPR.S KISER / HAZ # 136-665 (313) 4g2-i2i
IMSP #26 YPSILANTI 97
1 CLOSED
DSORDZERIY PERSON/DWLS:
VENUE:
Primary incident occurred at: Intersection of Hewitt and Wathtenhw
Ave. Vehicle VB Hewitt crossing Washtsinw,lvt.
Secondary venue occurred at: TOTAL GAS ST9. located on the NW corner
of intersection described in primary venue.
DATE/TIME:
Incident occurred on 09/05/88 at: 04:30 A.M. (Monday).
VEHICLE INVOLVED:
1977 TriUmph 2Dr Convertable. Blue in color bearing 89/MI 721 VRJ.
Disposition of vehicle: Towed from scene to Ypsi Towing. No Hold.
INFORMATION:
U/S while on patrol were EB on WashtenaW Ave approaching Hewitt Rd.
Said intersection was controlled by a traffic signal, traffic signal
w&A obAdrved flashing Yellow for EB and WB WashtenaW Ave traffic.
Signal wah further observed, Flashing RED for traffic NB and SB on
Hewitt Rd.
Vbhicle listed above was observed to be travelling NB on Hewitt Rd.
and at An 6stimated speed of 35 MPH. Vehicle did NOT stop or slow for
thi flathing RED signal.
Vehicle Was then pursued by U/S and a subsequent traffic stop ensued.
U/S observed driver of vehicle to look over at patrol unit, now About
to make a NB turn onto Hewitt and behind target vehicle.
C . : I5 Z K v T z T a b W Y 
t t c e M
± ffi,15A E
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Vehicle then made an Abrupt left tu'h into th* tOTAL OAS fthtioh And
pulled into one of the pump stations.
U/S pulled up to the pump station ntar auspect vehicle. U/t obsgrved
th6 driver to 6xit his vehicle and begin wAlking up towardl the
bUildint.
U/S obtAined the drivers attention and requested samb to return to the
vihicle. Driver began walking towards officeS.
CONTACT DRIVEP./OeSERVATIONS:
Upon making contact with the Driver U/S was met with i atd Actions.
with Driver stating that this wasnt hncessary. U/S advisad the Driver
that running a RED light was a necessary stop. Tpr. KISEA making
contact with Driver requested subject to produce hit HICH bDiv4ki
license, Registration and Proof of Insukance for the motor vehicl&.
Driver's attention was then directed away from U/S And to Tpr HAAZ who
waS utilizing his hand held flash light t; look into thb driver tide
of the vethicle. Driver was observed to make statements directed
towards Tpr. MRAZ indicating to the effect, "What are you doing
looking in my car"?
Further. Driver stated U/S have no right looking insidi his vehicle
and that he knew the law well enough to know "WE" need a srarch
warrant to look into his vehicle.
TPR RISER at this time again asked Driver to produce his License at
which time Driver again asked what he was being "Harrassed" for.
U/S explained that they observed him run the RED light and that this
Was the reason for being stopped, and U/S did not feel they were
conducting themselves in any offensive manner. Driver then began
indicating that he did NOT run the RED light, that he came to 6
complett Stop and that U/S were making th4s up for a reason to Harrass
homebody.
Driver continued with verbal accusations of U/S being the "Strong
Arbed Vitilanties" and "Taking things out on the Working Public".
Driver t'peatedly stated: "I have no respect for YOU people", and
"You Are Bigots".
tJhen driver was asked questions pertaining to and surroUnding the
4vents leading up to the incident at hand, would make strong, detailed
emarka indicating that the POLICE cant get away with these kinds of
things,
CAUSE FOR ARREST:
U/S upon continuing the normal course of action on this traffic stop
filt un&asy With the Situation as the Driver was acting in a manner
Such to create U/S with a concern for *afety of Officers. U/S has made
rPRT RAZ FRAp. 2 o4
2 TPR: IPISEA. WAVNE
.7' XUIBTT B, p. 2 of 4
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many traffic stops and has not come into contact with 06riohl actint
in this nature without attempting to hid* somethint or pofiibly having
contraband or a weapon about their person or hccisaibl inbidt
vehicle.
U/S requested driver to place his hands on the hood of hit vehicie and
li1 oad his feet back in the normal wall Se&rch position. U/S &*Itid the
subject if he possessed any weapons, Cunt. knives. dtc... briv k
stated that U/S could not search him unless he was Arretstd fo home
offense.
U/S again explained to the subject that they wished to pat him down
only to dispell the possibility of him hAving any weAponi.
Driver continually stated that he was HOT letting U/S at him down.
Driver was arrested.for Disorderly Person. Driver wia theh handcuffed
and patted down with no weapons being found.
Subsequent radio traffic with HSP #26 RIO Koths r~fdrnch Drivert.
status and vehicle information found Driver to be Subpbnddd on two (2)
VCJ's out of Detroit.
#1. Suspension Date / 12/30/87 FCJ # E'36428 / Careless Driving.
#2. Suspension Date / 12/30/87 FC3 # E736429 / Reg and/or ?lite
violation.
ARRESTEDt
H DUJON-JOHNSON B/M 04/25/59 of: 800 W Huron St Apt. #5, Ann Arbor.
HI. OLN # 252 S66 000 318. SS# 381 74 1S77. Employed: U of 4 Medical
Records Section/also Student UofH. S-10 145 Elk Bro. Married.
Count #1.
DWLS. Citation issued. Bond of t100.00 requested. Held at HSP
pending that action.
Count #2.
Disorderly Person. UD-7B issued. PR bond given. panda subjects
cont
tact with 14-B Dist Ct of Juris within 10 Days.
SOS REOUEST:
MSP #26 R/O Koths sent request via LEIN to SOS for certified copy of
driving record for arrested.
PROSECUTOR CONTACT:
Copy of this complaint sent to Wash Co Pros Ofe for teview and
Authorization of Disorderly Person.
- EXHIBIT B, p. 3 of 4
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t . °so bar.. ,e ZZS t-88...DST*'o
SEP 0S, jgga 026- 01~-8B
IniAL NCIDENT ....... IL5 ....
M 4 S200
WITNESSESs
Due to the Drivers actions and statements beinj mide, U/S madi contact
with the two on duty employees of the TOTAL GAS STA.
Said employees were within eyesight of the vehicle in qUlition and
wUre riquested to supply U/S with their name(s) for any pokaibl
future complaint this subject would mhkd pertaining to Actiong of
ofticerk this night.
#1. ALLEN ADKINS W/H oft
#2. PATRICIA WINTON W/F of:
Subject #1 listed above indicted to U/S that he did not watch the
entire incident however did observe that the B/H aubject was giving
U/S officers a hard time and not being very cooperative.
Subject #2 indicated about the same observation(i) Al did #1.
COMPLAINT STATUSi
CLOSED.
.- a 1 sNvu.rZeaTmb 
my
*// / EXHIBIT B, p. 4 of 4
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Upon reading the report, I immediately concluded that the en-
counter between our client and the state troopers was an improper
Terry-stop that had escalated into a pretext arrest. In Terry v.Ohio,' 7
the Supreme Court extended the Fourth Amendment's prohibition
of "unreasonable searches and seizures" to include the common po-
lice practice known as "stop-and-frisk," an interference with liberty
short of a full arrest in which a police officer approaches a person
she suspects of criminal activity for a brief interrogation.", In order
to protect the officer's safety during this brief encounter with a pos-
sible criminal, the officer is allowed to "seize" the suspect long
enough to conduct a "pat-down" search for weapons if the officer
has particularized reasons for believing that the suspect is presently
armed and dangerous.' 9 The Court emphasized that such a stop-
and-frisk, a procedure now named the "Terry-stop" after the Terry
case, requires more than an "unparticularized suspicion or
'hunch'." 20
Taking the incident report as true, it was clear that although the
troopers could ask our client to produce his drivers license and re-
gistration if they had seen him violate a traffic law, that traffic viola-
tion alone gave them no reason to believe he was armed and
dangerous. As for the statements appearing under the heading
"Cause for Arrest" in the report, they certainly added up to no
more than mere suspicion. A pat-down search incident to a Terry-
stop must be based on some particular observation that indicates
the suspect has a weapon on his person or in reaching distance, such
as a suspicious bulge or a sudden movement toward a pocket, com-
bined with evidence of potential dangerousness, typically supplied
by the crime the officer suspects the person committed. 21
Under my analysis, which continued to take the report as true,
when our client (quite justifiably) refused to submit to the pat-down
search, the trooper converted the stop into a pretext arrest to cover
the impropriety of the search. Under United States v. Robinson,22 a
police officer may conduct a complete body search of a person upon
arrest regardless of whether the officer has any basis for believing
that the arrestee has weapons, contraband, or other evidence on his
person.23 When an officer makes an arrest in order to take advan-
tage of the broad Robinson exception to the usual Fourth Amend-
17 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
18 Id. at 30, 31.
19 Id.
20 Id. at 27.
21 Id. at 27, 30.
22 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
23 Id. at 235.
1992] 1309
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ment requirements for conducting searches, that arrest is termed by
most commentators as a pretext arrest.24
In our case, it seemed clear to me, the troopers arrested our
client on the pretext that he was "a disorderly person. '25 The
"hunch" that our client had a weapon turned out to be wrong and
the troopers were then forced to carry through the charade that our
client had committed a misdemeanor.
C. The Initial Client Interview
Students in the Michigan General Clinic work in teams of two.
Although each team is closely supervised by a clinical professor who
bears the ultimate professional responsibility for representation,
one goal of the clinic is to encourage the students to view the cases
as their own and thus enter fully into the professional role of lawyer.
To this end, the initial client interview usually occurs without the
professor present, although, with the client's consent, the interview
is videotaped for later review by the students and the professor.
The two student attorneys met DujonJohnson for the first time
on January 25, 1989, more than four months after his arrest on Sep-
tember 5, 1988. The interview took place in the Clinic's conference
room, a converted faculty office located off the opulent neo-Gothic
library reading room of the Michigan Law School. Johnson was
seated at the end of a massive wooden table with the student attor-
neys located on either side of him along the sides of the table.
Above the table, suspended from a florescent light fixture, was a
microphone for audio pickup. The video camera was rather obtru-
sively mounted on an adjacent file cabinet that concealed the re-
cording equipment within. Following standard clinic practice, the
students obtained Johnson's written consent to the video recording
of the interview before the equipment was turned on.
The videotape of the interview lasted about 50 minutes. I
viewed it in the company of the students several days later with
three major objectives in mind: to critique the students' interview-
ing techniques, to get an initial impression of the client, and to
check his story against the police report for inconsistencies.
24 This substantive Fourth Amendment law is discussed infra at notes 162-91 and
accompanying text.
25 The police report indicated that Johnson was also charged with driving while
license suspended ("DWLS"). POLICE REPORT, supra note 16, at 1. That charge, how-
ever, could not have been the basis for the arrest and pat-down, because the troopers
only learned about the suspended license afterJohnson was searched and cuffed. Id. at
3. The license suspension apparently arose out of a misunderstanding regarding
whetherJohnson had paid two prior tickets. The prior tickets were taken care of and the
DWLS charge was dropped before we entered the case.
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As for my impressions of Dujon Johnson, he seemed poised,
articulate and likeable. Indeed, I remember commenting to the stu-
dents that it seemed that our client was managing the impressions
he created in the interview with at least as much care as the students
were managing their interviewing techniques. I learned by way of
background that Johnson had served in the military and worked
both as an assistant in a law school library and as a paralegal. He
was currently finishing his undergraduate degree at the University
of Michigan and planning to get a Master's degree in Chinese Stud-
ies. He was married and lived in Detroit. His means were very lim-
ited. At the time of the interview, he had been unable to repair his
car and had to commute the forty miles to Ann Arbor for classes by
bus. He had no prior criminal record. He was black, a fact we knew
before the interview from the identifying abbreviation in the police
report: "B/M" ("Black Male"). 26
As I viewed the tape, I noted four major inconsistencies be-
tween the police report and Johnson's story of what happened that
night.27 First, our client adamantly maintained that he had come to
a full stop before proceeding through the intersection. Second, he
insisted that the troopers did not tell him that he had run a red light
or otherwise explain their actions until after his arrest. Third, he
said he was neither belligerent nor demonstrative before he was
handcuffed. Finally, he denied accusing the troopers of being
"strong armed vigilantes" or of "taking things out on the working
public." He did, however, confirm saying, "I have no respect for
you people." His response when asked if he said, "you are bigots,"
was ambiguous: "I may have said that. I don't think I said, 'you are
bigots.' "
D. The Suppression Motion
Our client's story further confirmed my theory that this was a
case of a pretext arrest. I also saw in one detail ofJohnson's narra-
tive a way of advancing this theory in a pretrial motion. He insisted
he was neither demonstrative nor belligerent before Trooper Kiser
demanded that he submit to a frisk, a claim that seemed consistent
with the personality he displayed during the interview. Arguably, if
the demand to be frisked was illegal, then our client was entitled to
complain loudly; indeed state law suggested he would have even
26 The two students and I were all white men. The judge, the prosecutor, and
Trooper Kiser were also white men; Trooper Frank Mraz was identified by the judge as a
Native American, but our client described him as white.
27 After consulting with me, the students decided not to show the police report to
our client before or during the interview.
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had the right to resist by force.28 But rather than wait until the trial
to challenge the legality of the frisk order, it occurred to me to take
the offensive and file a suppression motion.
Typically, a motion to suppress on Fourth Amendment grounds
is brought to prevent the introduction of incriminating physical evi-
dence. The purpose of our motion was somewhat unusual: to sup-
press all statements made by our client from the moment that the
trooper demanded that he submit to the pat-down search, on the
theory that these statements were the "fruit" of constitutional viola-
tions. If, as our client reported, the only arguably "disorderly" con-
duct took place after the encounter escalated into the frisk order,
suppression of this evidence would greatly weaken, if not destroy,
the prosecution's case. 29
I was far from certain that this somewhat novel tactic would suc-
ceed in securing a pretrial dismissal. In part, the motion was ap-
pealing simply for tactical reasons. It created the basis for a pretrial
evidentiary hearing that would give us the opportunity to cross-ex-
amine the troopers for discovery and to preserve their testimony for
possible impeachment use at trial. I also wanted a chance to intro-
duce the judge to our Fourth Amendment theory before trial and
28 The relevant case law held that a citizen has the right to resist an illegal arrest
even by force if necessary as long as the force is no greater than needed. See People v.
Landrie, 335 N.W.2d 11 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983). The illegality of an arrest is a complete
defense to the charge of resisting arrest, and the state cannot evade this defense by
charging peace disturbance instead of resisting arrest. People v. Davenport, 215
N.W.2d 702 (Mich. Ct. App. 1974).
29 Here, excerpted from our brief in support of the suppression motion, is the story
we told the court:
In the police report there is absolutely no evidence other than unpar-
ticularized suspicion or hunch that defendant was armed and dangerous.
The troopers approached defendant after he had emerged from his car.
He stood in their plain view. There is no indication that the officers had
any visual clue, such as a lump in his waistband, that might make them
suspect defendant of carrying a weapon on his person. He made no
threatening movements of any sort. Indeed, all that is reported is the
irate questioning of the police officer's actions and accusations of miscon-
duct and harassment. Taking the report at face value, we are asked to
believe that the officers could reasonably conclude that defendant was
"attempting to hid [sic] something or possibly having [sic] ... a weapon
about [his] person" simply because he made what some people would
think were rude statements to police.
At no time during the incident in question did defendant do more
than object to demands made of him by the police and ask the reason for
these demands. The troopers could not have had a reasonable suspicion
that defendant was armed and dangerous. The request for pat down thus
was improper and the fruit of that unlawful conduct should be
suppressed.
Defendant's Motion to Suppress at 5-7, People v.Johnson, (No. 88-1205 (1989)) (on file
with Cornell Law Review).
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test his receptivity. If he was receptive, we might elect to have a
bench trial, but if he was not, we would proceed with a jury.
E. The Suppression Hearing
The Ypsilanti Township courthouse rises incongruously out of
a wasteland of abandoned fields. A sweeping driveway takes one
past a man-made pool complete with fountain and ducks, and up to
a modern glass and brick complex. Inside, all is clean and well-ap-
pointed; the two courtrooms are flanked by convenient conference
rooms and a comfortable lounge marked "for lawyers only."
The undisputed monarch of this small but impressive domain
was Judge John Collins. I had appeared before Judge Collins on a
number of previous occasions and had mixed feelings about him. I
had been told that was an auto worker before becoming a lawyer
(Ypsilanti Township is the site of a major automotive plant). He had
worked as a prosecutor, township attorney, and in private practice
before his elevation. I was surprised on more than one occasion to
hear him draw on his personal familiarity with one or more of the
parties before him in discussing a case. Indeed, I sometimes won-
dered how many township residents he did not know. His style was
folksy but authoritative.30
When we showed up in court for the hearing on our suppres-
sion motion, we found that despite notice to the prosecutor and the
troopers that we intended to examine both troopers at the hearing,
neither trooper appeared. The judge accepted the prosecutor's ex-
planation that their supervisor at the state police post had not re-
ceived sufficient advance notice.
We were therefore forced to begin with our client's testimony
and then continue the hearing to another date for the troopers' tes-
timony. Thus, the only testimony at the first hearing was from our
client. I have no notes of his testimony, and we never ordered a
transcript. Now as I write this article, I have no clear recollection of
what he said other than an impression that it was consistent with his
interview and favorable to his case if believed. In retrospect, I find
ominously significant my lack of attention to his testimony.
My recollection is that Judge Collins paid little overt attention
to Johnson's testimony either. Much of the time his chair was ro-
tated away from the witness stand, so that he could not have looked
at our client while he testified even if he had wanted to do so. One
point definitely did catch his attention, though: the claim that the
troopers might have stopped Johnson because he was black. I do
30 In personality and style, Judge Collins resembles the "Law Maker" judge de-
scribed by Conley and O'Barr. See CONLEY & O'BARR, supra note 10, at 87-90.
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not recall that our client specifically made this claim during his testi-
mony; however, because we had attached the police report to our
motion, the judge could have constructed this claim out of the state-
ments in the report that Johnson told Kiser "[you are] making this
up [the traffic violation] for a reason to Harass somebody" and
"You are bigots." I know that this point attracted Judge Collins's
attention because he volunteered at some point during that first
hearing that Trooper Mraz was an Indian (i.e. Native American); he
seemed to thereby imply that the actions of the trooper team that
night could not have been racially motivated.
At the conclusion of our client's testimony, we made a futile
attempt to obtain a ruling on our motion based solely on the record
as it stood, arguing that the prosecutor had the burden of producing
the troopers to rebut our client's testimony. The judge would have
none of it. He wanted to hear "both sides of the story," and so the
hearing was continued to a date five weeks later to take the troopers'
testimony. The prosecutor agreed that he would produce both
troopers without requiring us to subpoena them.
The appointed day for the continued hearing came, but
Trooper Kiser did not.3 ' The prosecutor said that Trooper Kiser
was ill. Thus the only testimony was from Trooper Mraz, who
seemed a quiet and well-spoken young man.
We took the lead in examining Mraz. Consistent with my usual
practice as a clinical teacher, I allowed the student attorneys to con-
duct the hearing following a detailed outline that we had rehearsed
in advance. I spoke only to deal with evidentiary objections and to
ask a few follow-up questions at the conclusion of the testimony. I
was delighted with the results of the student's examination of Mraz.
When initially asked to admit that Johnson did not appear armed
and dangerous when first seen,3 2 Mraz responded with a suggestive
evasion:
31 Our client was also not present. We had told him that although he was not re-
quired to be present (since he had already testified), we strongly encouraged him to
come to assist us in the examination of the troopers and to observe them as preparation
for trial. He had indicated that he would be there so his absence was unexpected. Dis-
cussions between the student attorneys and Johnson about attending this hearing
proved to be a significant source of tension in the attorney-client relationship. See infra
notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
32 The student's question was: "At the point and time which you got out of the car
and saw the defendant walking up to the station, he didn't appear to be acting in a way
that would indicate that he was armed and dangerous, did he?" Evidentiary Hearing at
4 (1988) (No. 88-0128), People v.Johnson (on file with Cornell Law Review) [hereinafter
Hearing].
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At that point there was no way of telling, he had clothes on it was
winter time,3 3 he could have been armed, he could have been
dangerous. Any time you make a traffic stop, it could be a [sic]
armed and dangerous person behind the wheel, or a passenger in
the vehicle.
The student pressed for an answer:
Q But there was nothing that he specifically did that indicated
that he was carrying a weapon? At that point.
A Like I said, stated every time we pull over somebody we treat
it as if they were armed and dangerous.
Q So, at that point and time, you didn't really have any reason to
believe there was any criminal activity afoot, did you?
A Besides running the red light, no.
[colloquy between court and counsel deleted]3 4
Like I said before, I treat them like everyone is armed and danger-
ous, I don't relax.3 5
The student attorney then went through a litany of possible rea-
sons under Terry that would justify a frisk, and Mraz consistently ad-
mitted that none were present in their encounter with Johnson.3 6
33 In fact the arrest took place on September 5. We never pointed out this inconsis-
tency to Mraz or the judge.
34 At this point I objected that the witness had not answered the question. The
judge directed us to rephrase the question, which I stated as, "whether or not there was
anything he specifically did that led them to believe that he was armed?" Hearing, supra
note 32, at 6.
35 Id. at 5-6.
36 The relevant testimony included the following:
Q So during the time right after Mr. Johnson came back to the area of
the two cars, and Trooper Kiser began asking questions.., did you
see any lumps or bulges in his clothing?
A No I did not.
Q That might conceal a weapon?
A A lot of times you don't see bulges in the clothing.
Q But at that point you didn't see anything that looked like a weapon?
A No I did not.
Q During the course of the incident you heard Mr. Johnson accuse you
and Trooper Kiser for harassing you didn't you?
A Yes.
Q And you also heard him call you and Trooper Kiser bigots, is that
correct?
A Yes.
Q But you never heard him threaten you or Trooper Kiser with physical
harm did you?
A No.
Q And you never heard him state that he was carrying any kind of
weapon or contraband did you?
A No.
Q And he didn't make any furtive gestures did he?
A Is, what do you mean by furtive?
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He then attempted with some success to trap Mraz into admitting
that our client was frisked, not because he appeared armed and dan-
gerous, but simply because he spoke up for his rights.
Q Then isn't it true that Mr. Johnson didn't really do anything
that caused Trooper Kiser to submit him to a pat down
search, other than make the statements that [are] recorded in
your report?
A I'm sorry what statements are they?
Q That him calling you and Trooper Kiser bigots and accusing
you of harassing him.
A No. The reason Trooper Kiser patted him down is that, for his
safety along with mine. Any time somebody exits the car that
we believe, we don't know ok, we do a pat down, it's not a
search, it's a pat down for any sense of weapons.
Q I understand.
A And he, Mr. Johnson ah, argued about that our pat down, was
illegal and said you are not patting me down, that brings up
our intensity level a little bit higher, more cause for alarm, so
Trooper Kiser patted him down for offensive weapons.
Q So, the reason, the main reason for the pat down was then
because he had refused to submit voluntary [sic]?
A Basically the pat down was done for the officer's safety, the
troopers' safety, myself and Trooper Kiser.3 7
I then conducted the following series of follow-up questions:
Q It's your testimony that it is your policy, your partner's policy
to conduct a pat down search of any driver who is outside his
car after a traffic stop, is that your testimony?
A That's correct.
Q And it was for that reason in this case you asked Mr. Johnson
to submit to a pat down search, is that correct?
A I did not.
Q Or your partner did?
A Yes.
Q I mean he didn't make any sudden movements with his hand toward a
pocket or the interior of any of his clothing.
A Well, when he was talking, he was talking with his hands, and they
were moving thrashing about and so forth. As far as going into a
pocket or anything like that, I don't recall him making any motion
going into his pocket.
Q And he didn't try to run away at any point, did he?
A No.
Q And he didn't try and get back into his car and leave, before the
arrest was made?
A No.
Id. at 8-10.
37 Id. at 10-11.
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Q Ok. And it is your testimony that when your partner asked
Mr. Johnson to submit to a pat down search, Mr. Johnson re-
fused, is that true?
A That's true.
Q His refusal, in your testimony heightened you [sic] suspicion
of him, is that your testimony?
A Yes.
Q And because of his refusal, you and your partner then did
conduct a pat down search, is that your testimony?
A No.
Q Because of his refusal, you and your partner arrested him?
A My partner arrested him.
Q All right. And he arrested because of his refusal to submit to
the pat down search?
A No, he arrested him for being disorderly throughout the
whole incident.
Q If Mr. Johnson had not refused to voluntarily submit to a pat
down search, he would have not been arrested for a disor-
derly person at that time, isn't that true?
A I can't ah, I can't say one way or another.
Q Because you did not make the arrest?
A You're asking me a hypothetical and I can't answer what
would have been, I can only answer the facts of the case.
Q Was Mr. Johnson's refusal to submit to the pat down search,
one of the reasons he was arrested for being a disorderly
person.
A Yes.
Q At that point, what other things had he done, to be a disor-
derly person, other than refuse to submit to the pat down
search?
A By saying that the only reason that we stopped him was be-
cause he was black, that we couldn't do things that we did as
far as myself flashing the flashlight in through the windows to
check for any contraband in the vehicle, Trooper Kiser stop-
ping him in the first place, because he knew his rights, his
howlering [sic - hollering?] at the, ah myself and Trooper Ki-
ser for things that he knew we were doing illegally, all led up
to that, acting disorderly.
THE COURT: Maybe for the record, when we got into
this bigot and racial thing, maybe for the
record we should indicate that Mr. Dujon
Johnson is a black american.
MR. CUNNINGHAM: That is correct your honor.
THE COURT: And can we stipulate as to what the na-
tionality or race the other officers are.
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PROSECUTOR: We're going to, I'm sure that this isn't
the end of this hearing, your honor, so
we're going to have Trooper Kiser on the
stand at some point and time, so he can
probably tell us himself.
Q Trooper Mraz, was it your understanding, that part of what
Mr. Johnson was saying prior to his arrest that he believed he
was being stopped and investigated because that he was
black?
A Yes.
Q You said he was hollering?
A Yes, he kept yelling at us, "you can't do this, you can't do
that" and of course of our traffic stop. 38
The prosecutor's examination of Trooper Mraz was limited:
Q Just a few questions.... What did you stop, what was the
traffic offense for?
A The stop was made initially because of the ah, ah Mr. Johnson
running the flashing, going under the flashing red light, ah on
northbound Hewitt and Washtenaw.
Q When you came upon him, or at what point and time was the
arrest made, do you recall? Was there any search prior to the
arrest?
A No.
Q Now, when you asked him if you could perform a pat down
search on him, or when you went to perform a pat down
search on him, what words did you use?
A You can't ah.
Q What you [sic] words did you use?
A Did I use. I didn't use any words.
38 My questioning then concluded with the following interchange:
Q Who was present at the time other than you and your partner?
A There were two people in the Total gas station booth.
Q Inside the booth?
A Inside.
Q Do you have any evidence that they could hear what they were
saying?
A NoIdonot.
Q He was hollering only at you and your partner, is that true?
A Yes.
Q As far as you know, you and your partner are the only ones that heard
what he said, as far as you know?
A As far as I know.
Q Ok. My understanding of your testimony is that you listed five things
that he did, which caused him to be arrested for disturbing the peace
or being a disorderly person. Is there anything else you want to add
in terms of what he did, or have you told me everything as far as you
remember?
A As far as I remember.
Q I don't think we have any more questions at this time.
Id. at 14-17.
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Q Did you, were any words used?
A Trooper Kiser talked to him.
Q Ok. What did he say?
A He informed him that the reason that he was doing a pat
down, for ah, all I'm going to do is check for offensive
weapons.
Q And did he, was it a question, was it, was he looking for a
response, was he asking him if he could pat him down?
A Basically informed him that he was going to be doing a pat
down for the safety of both the troopers present.
Q Now, tell me about his, about the defendant's demeanor.
A Very hostile toward the, myself and Trooper Kiser.
Q What about his tone of voice?
A In an angry type voice.
Q What was the intensity of his voice?
A Loud.
Q What about his physical actions.
A Thrashing about, waving his arms and fists and saying (sic).
Q Is this usual, on a civil infraction for somebody to act like this?
A No, no not at all.
Q And uh, what were some of his personal behaviors? .... To-
wards yourself and just his actions in general on that specific
date and time.
A Hostile toward us, really for no uh.
Q Any other customers in the area in the parking area.... Were
there any other individuals?
A No.
Q Pedestrian traffic?
A No.
Q That's it. Nothing further.
THE COURT: Did you know this individual?
A No I did not.
THE COURT: Did you get any indication that Officer Kiser
knew him?
A No.39
Mraz's testimony ended at this point. One of the cliches of
teaching trial practice is the warning against asking one too many
questions, the wisdom of knowing when to stop. We were so
pleased with Trooper Mraz's testimony-his admission that there
were no specific facts suggesting our client was armed and danger-
ous, his description of their practice of treating every driver as if the
person were armed and dangerous, and his catalogue of the "things
our client had done" to be a disorderly person-that we decided to
submit our motion for decision that day rather than insist on ob-
39 Id. at 17-21.
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taining the testimony of Trooper Kiser at yet another continued
hearing. Although I still wanted a chance to meet Trooper Kiser
and preserve his testimony for impeachment use at trial, I was will-
ing to give up these desires rather than risk altering what I viewed as
a near-perfect record for our motion.
The hearing on our motion therefore concluded that day with
brief arguments by one of the student attorneys and the prosecutor.
Of course I was prepared for the possibility of losing our motion,
despite the strength of the record. However, when the judge imme-
diately issued his bench opinion after our arguments, I was shocked
by the words he used in articulating his decision to deny our motion:
THE COURT: Well, there's no doubt in my mind, this is defi-
nitely an attitude arrest and had the person not exhibited the atti-
tude that he exhibited he never would have been arrested, I think
that's pretty obvious, and I don't think there's anything wrong
with that. I think that officers out on the street are human subject
to the same human responses that other people have, and that
they react as humans react.
I don't have any problems at all with the traffic stop, this is a
valid traffic stop[.] [T]he elements of a valid stop are that a stop
must be based on specific and [sic] conduct which would lead a
reasonable person to believe that criminal activity is afoot, that's
Terry versus Ohio. Civil infraction is sort of a [hybrid], it really
isn't quote criminal activity, but certainly the officers had justifica-
tion to stop this vehicle[.] [T]hey didn't just see a black man in a
gas station and say ["]oh there's a black man in the gas station,
let's go and arrest him,["] and that didn't happen. [And] the fact
that one person is black and the other person is caucasian does
not make it a racial instant [sic-incident?]. I don't see any prob-
lem with stopping this individual.
[O]nce having stopped him, he was the author of his own
problems[.] [H]e started getting, acting strange and unusual,
started walking away from the car as if he was conducting some
business in the gas station, raising his hands, howlering [sic] at the
officers, causing a disturbance of his own making, howlering [sic]
racism because they stopped him for running a red light[.] I'm
sure that these two officers had no clue when they saw this person
run the red light, whether he was black or white or brown or red
or green or any other color[.] [T]hey just didn't know and so the
person was walking around with a chip on his shoulder and these
officers were the object of that behavior.
Then the officer asked him, and again in the Terry case, they
say once a valid stop is made the officer may engage in a protec-
tive search if there's reason to believe the stopped individual is
armed and presently dangerous[.] [O]n this particular case they
didn't have any reason to believe that the person was armed and
presently dangerous. I have said on numerous occasions and I
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think I'll continue to say until some Court tells me that I'm dead
wrong, that the first duty a police officer has in this society is to
survive and I don't think that I'm ever going to find that the police
officer is acting unreasonably when he stops an individual for a
valid stop and does a brief pat down to protect both himself and
his partner.
In this particular case there seems to be a request for pat
down which was denied[.] [N]ow at that point and time, had the
individual agreed to the pat down and it turned out that he did
not have any weapon, then obviously that would have been the
end of it and the police would have just exercised their discretion
and moved on. On this particular case, the individual case, the
individual says no, I'm not going to let you pat me down[.] [At]
that point and time I think the officers exercised their discretion
and said look, we didn't have to arrest this guy for disorderly con-
duct for running his mouth in the manner that he did, but if he's
gonna act like this then we're gonna exercise that discretion and
arrest him. [O]nce they put him under arrest they have a right to
do a pat down search, which they did. I think it's definitely an
attitude ticket, no question about it.40
The most obvious surprise in the bench opinion was the judge's
apparent refusal to follow the authority of Terry. He acknowledged
that in this case the troopers "didn't have any reason" to believe
that our client was armed and presently dangerous. Yet he implied
that the troopers nonetheless could require our client to submit to a
search, by saying that he did not think he would ever find that a
police officer had acted "unreasonably" by conducting a pat-down
search, because the officer's "first duty" was to survive.
The more enduring surprise, though, was the judge's confident
description of "what happened" as an "attitude ticket." I had never
heard the phrase before, but I thought I had a good idea of what the
judge meant. Our client was arrested for having a "bad attitude,"
pure and simple. The judge was sure that this was what happened,
did not think there was "anything wrong with that," and was as cas-
ual as he was confident in his comments.
In describing my reaction to hearing Judge Collins's bench
opinion, I use the word "shock" quite deliberately without any de-
sire to be overdramatic. "Shock" evokes the image of touching a
live wire, producing two successive, but very different reactions.
First, I felt momentarily paralyzed and numb -my breath was taken
away, I was speechless. What could I possibly say? The judge had
with casual authority sanctioned not just a specific instance of police
misconduct, but a whole way, a whole world of police-citizen inter-
40 Id. at 27-29.
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action, that seemed to me clearly unlawful. What was obvious to
him, and obviously acceptable to him, was obviously wrong to me.
But the death-like paralysis of a shock passes, sometimes to be
replaced with galvanized movement, for a shock can be a jolt that
revitalizes. Judge Collins's bench opinion jolted me out of thinking
about what happened only in Fourth Amendment terms.
F. Returning to the Client's Story
At the time of the suppression hearing I was working on an ear-
lier article that experimented with the metaphor of translation both
by examining its epistemological implications and by applying it to
two earlier clinic cases I had handled. (The article was called A Tale
of Two Clients: Thinking About Law as Language.)4 1 I presented a draft
of the article at a symposium about a week before Johnson's trial
was scheduled to begin. In the small-group symposium discussions
that preceded my presentation, 42 I found myself talking more about
Johnson's case than about the two cases described in the draft. In
the midst of the symposium I decided to devote my twenty minute
presentation in the final session to a presentation and discussion of
the Johnson case, not just as an illustration of my theory of lawyer-
ing as translation, but as a shared opportunity with the other sympo-
sium participants to apply and test that theory in practice.
To prepare for my presentation, I went back and reviewed the
videotape of the initial client interview. In particular I watched sev-
eral times the following portion in which Johnson described "what
happened" after he exited his car at the gas station:
43
CL: He whipped around and pulled in off of Hewett. In other
words, he pulled in as if he was blocking my car. And,
um, I didn't do anything about it, as far as I was
concerned. And the guy said "Hey Yo." That kind of
ticks me off. I saw a police officer getting out, putting on
black gloves, and he says "Hey yo, you." And I said
you're not talking to me, are you? "Yeah, I am talking to
41 See Clark D. Cunningham, A Tale of Two Clients: Thinking About Law as Language, 87
MICH. L. REV. 2459 (1987).
42 The Law Review editors who organized the symposium had designed an admira-
ble format. For the first day of the conference, symposium authors, editors, and confer-
ence participants met in small editing groups to read, discuss, and provide feedback on
the papers. This procedure resulted in much more collaborative and less adversarial
interaction than is often found at such conferences. See Kim L. Scheppele, Foreword:
Telling Stories, 87 MIcH. L. REv. 2073, 2076-77 (1989) (describing symposium format).
43 I produced this and later transcriptions from the videotaped interview by record-
ing the audio portion of the videotape on cassette tape which was then stenographically
transcribed by my secretary. I then edited her transcript by repeatedly watching the
videotape to correct ambiguities and fill in barely audible segments from context. "CL"
indicates statements by the client; "ST" indicates statements by either student attorney.
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you." I asked him what he stopped me for. Well, he
walked to me -
ST: How far from the car were you when he called you?
CL: Four meters from the car. He pulled in front of the car,
blocking it after I got out. And he was the first one out of
the car because I really didn't realize they were there until
he said "Hey yo." By that time he was right in front of
my car and I was walking away. And I said, "You are not
talking to me, are you?" And he said, "Yeah, you, yo."
And he was putting gloves, his old black gloves on-
macho kind of thing. And -
ST: Were they white?
CL: Yeah.
ST: Both of them?
CL: Yes. I said, "Is there a problem here?" He said, "Yeah-
come here." And as he was talking the other officer had a
flash light and was looking into my car.
ST: So that one guy was talking to you and the other guy was
flashing a light into your car? Were you, were the
windows in your car rolled up?
CL: Everything was rolled up. I told him, "You don't have
permission to look in my car nor can you look without my
consent." I wasn't sure but that's what I told them-I'm
not sure if that's the law. "But if you want to look, that's
OK. I have nothing to hide."
I said, "What did I do wrong?" He said, "What's your
name?" I said, "What did I do wrong?" He said, "What's
your name?"
So they said, "Do you have your license?" "I don't have a
license on me, it is in the car." So I went inside the car.
And I said "I want to know why you stopped me."
So I had my wallet with my running bag with the gear. I
moved all the bagels and reached out my wallet.
He said, "You stand over here." I said, "What's the
problem? And he said, "You stand over here." He said,
"Are you going to be a tough guy?" I said, "I want to
know why you stopped me. You just can't arbitrarily stop
me for no reason."
So then the guy takes out his cuffs. I asked him, "What
are you doing?" I said "You are arresting me?" But he
didn't say a thing.
ST: He didn't answer you!?
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CL: No. No. I told him, "Now unless I'm mistaken and unless
I'm misinterpreting the Supreme Court opinion, if you are
putting cuffs on me, and you are detaining me, I am
certainly under arrest. And if you are arresting me, then
read me my rights and then I want to know why you are
arresting me."
He put the cuffs on me, told me to turn around, and I
said, "I want to know why you are arresting me." He sort
of turned me around and pushed my head forward.
CL: Part of the conversation when my face was on the hood
was essentially that I let him know I did not appreciate
him addressing me in the type of language he used.
ST: In what type of language did he use?
CL: He didn't use profanity. He just [inaudible]. I told him
that I was a tax-payer. If this was a suburbanite, you
wouldn't approach him with "Hey, yo." My wife and I
worked hard to go to school, to be respectable, and I
didn't appreciate you treating me like I was a sixteen-year
old kid, which obviously I am not.
He claims that, he claims then that "I treat everybody like
that." "Well I don't think you do, personally." And that
was really the end of the story.44
As I watched this segment of the tape, the word "attitude" kept
percolating in my mind. I found myself naming this "The Case of
the Client with an Attitude Problem" and then suddenly working
out the implications of that pun. Our client did in fact have an
"attitude problem," but the problem was not his attitude but that of
Trooper Kiser. As soon as I thought in terms of this
characterization of "what happened," I was amazed by how much
more I "saw" and "heard" in Johnson's narrative than when I had
viewed it initially, having already framed what happened in Fourth
Amendment terms. Every action by the police bristled with
assertive authority. The car did not simply "pullE] up to the . . .
station near [his] vehicle," as neutrally described in the police
report; it "whipped around and blocked [his] car." When Trooper
Kiser "obtained the driver's attention," he did so by calling out
"Hey, yo!" The most obviously symbolic detail was Johnson's
observation that as Trooper Kiser approached, he "put on his black
gloves."
44 Videotape of Initial Client Interview with M. Dujon Johnson at the University of
Michigan General Clinic (Jan. 25, 1989) (on file with author) [hereinafter Initial
Interview].
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I also noticed in Johnson's story a recurrent pattern in each
exchange between Johnson and Trooper Kiser: Johnson would ask
a question and receive an order instead of an answer; Johnson
would repeat the question and receive the same order.45 According
to Johnson's account, he never argued with the troopers nor lost his
temper until after the arrest. Instead, his attitude was a consistent
demand for respect, typified by the initial interchange. When Kiser
said "Hey yo," Johnson replied, "you're not talking to me, are
you?" My impression was not that Johnson actually thought the
trooper was addressing someone else, but rather that our client had
refused to acknowledge an address that was demeaning. His
insistence on an explanation from Kiser for the stop and frisk was
likewise not just a search for information, but maintenance of a
considered position that he was a citizen who deserved an
explanation from the police. When Johnson referred to himself as a
"respectable" person, he seemed to mean that not only was he "of
decent character," but more literally "worthy of respect," a respect
that Trooper Kiser refused to give.
The encounter thus became transformed for me into an
escalating clash of conflicting attitudes: Johnson's demand for
respect and Kiser's show of authority. Seen in this light, the arrest
no longer seemed motivated by the trooper's desire to search the
client. Rather, Johnson was arrested for being a "disorderly
person"-that is a person who would not take orders, who was
stubbornly resistant to authority, what Trooper Kiser referred to as
"a tough guy."
Indeed, in the taped interview, Johnson recognized that his
response to authority was a central issue and eloquently explained
why he did not consider his actions to be those of a "disorderly
person." When asked if he used profanity at any point during the
encounter, Johnson said:
I don't use that kind of language. First of all-[pause]-authority,
I think a person should respect it. At the same time, that places a
high level of standards on authority. So while I respect authority,
the abusing of it I don't respect. I told him [Kiser], I don't respect
you whatsoever.46
At my symposium presentation, I shared the first excerpt from
the client interview as well as portions of the police report and the
bench opinion. Almost everyone found the details I had previously
ignored, especially the black gloves, to be essential in persuasively
45 As one of the students perceptively observed later, the client was always hearing
demands when he had asked for answers. The client himself emphasized that "he
wouldn't answer me."
46 Initial Interview, supra note 44.
1992] 1325
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
recreating what happened from the client's viewpoint. Although all
the comments contributed to the events of the next week, two com-
ments from a fellow participant, Derrick Bell, 47 had the most imme-
diate and long-lasting effects. One comment lay fallow until much
later, and will therefore be discussed below. His other comment
had immediate effect. He observed that both the two tales of my
draft article and Johnson's case were fundamentally about clients
who sought to preserve their dignity and identity. His comment
highlighted a fact that I have not shared yet in this article, precisely
because it had been largely excluded from my thinking about the
case up until the time of the symposium.
One day during the period between the two evidentiary'hear-
ings on our suppression motion, one of the students stopped me to
relate a telephone conversation he had just had with Johnson. In
this conversation our client had revealed for the first time that, at
the arraignment before our appointment, the prosecutor had of-
fered to dismiss the criminal complaint if Johnson paid court costs.
Johnson told the student he had refused this deal.
Johnson's rejection of a deal that for fifty dollars would have
eliminated the risk of being found guilty made clear that he wanted
something more than simply being cleared of the misdemeanor
charge. Therefore, I began to think that my translation task might
require not only an innovative expression of "what happened" but
also a "new word" for relief.
G. Collaborating With the Client
Several days after the symposium ended, Johnson came in for a
meeting to plan for the upcoming trial. He arrived a few minutes
early, before the students had come down to the clinic, so I took the
opportunity to talk with him. I asked him what he wanted out of this
case. His response, as best as I can reconstruct from my memory
and a few notes taken at the time, included the following points: "I
would like to have my reputation restored, and my dignity. The in-
convenience can't be corrected. It got me a little unsettled, which is
very unusual for me. It's my honor, my name. I feel violated. They
tarnished my name." We talked for a few minutes about the results
of the arrest, how his car was towed, how he spent several hours
held at the state police post, how he had to show up late for work
the next day and felt that people knew he had gotten into some kind
of trouble.
47 Professor Derrick Bell is a distinguished African-American lawyer and academic.
See, e.g., DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED (1987); Derrick Bell, The Supreme Court,
1984 Term-Foreword: The Civil Rights Chronicles, 99 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1985).
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I then told him how I had been thinking about his case and
relating it to my ideas about representation. I said I wanted to find a
way to communicate to the judge and jury what the events had
meant to him. During the ensuing conversation, we developed the
idea of literally giving him a voice in the courtroom by having him
cross-examine Trooper Kiser.48 The idea had some appeal as a mat-
ter of trial strategy because such a cross-examination might almost
re-enact for the jury the confrontation of that night, giving them a
chance to see Johnson and Trooper Kiser interact directly rather
than through proxies. In effect we would be saying:
Observe Dujon Johnson as he asks the trooper to explain his ac-
tions; he was doing the same thing that night. Today he stands
behind a podium with the force of this court behind him as he asks
his questions; therefore, he receives answers. That night he stood
with only his own courage behind him; therefore, he received no
answers, only orders to submit to arbitrary authority. Today he
receives the respect to which all free citizens in a democracy are
entitled; he deserved no less that night.
But more importantly, under this novel approach the trial itself
could potentially provide the reliefJohnson sought: the restoration
of his dignity. The very structure of the trial would enable him to
obtain the answers, and the respect, he was denied that night. The
trooper would have to answer questions about why he stopped
Johnson, "what the problem was," and why he needed to conduct a
pat-down search. If Trooper Kiser was a smart witness, he would
answer directly and with courtesy, thus treating his interrogator as a
respectable person. If he did not treatJohnson with respect, assum-
ing that Johnson conducted the examination properly, the jury,
hopefully, would vindicate Johnson's view of who had the attitude
problem that night.
I emphasized to Johnson that this approach would require a
substantial amount of preparation time and would involve perhaps
some higher risk of conviction; the strategy could backfire and alien-
ate thejury. He said he was more than willing to put in the required
time and take the risk.
Reflecting back on this strategy, it seems to me that I was trying
to use the cross-examination of the trooper as a bridging experience
for two different translations. First, I wanted to translate to the jury
48 As best as I can recall, I was the first to raise the idea, but Johnson immediately
responded that he had been thinking about asking us if he could participate in cross-
examining Kiser. I did not discuss this important change in trial strategy with the stu-
dent attorneys before presenting it to the client, thus "taking over" the case from them
at a critical point. My intervention at this point without first involving the students was
inconsistent with the goal of encouraging them to take primary responsibility for their
clinic cases, see supra p. 1310, and probably was a mistake in terms of clinical pedagogy.
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our client's understanding of what happened by creating an analo-
gous event in the courtroom. I also wanted to bridge the gap be-
tween the relief our client said he wanted and the relief that the
limited vocabulary of the law enabled us to express. The law at-
tempts to tailor judicial remedies to the harm caused. We speak of
making a plaintiff "whole" as if courts can always restore what was
taken. But in this case, clearing Johnson of the charge of peace dis-
turbance seemed to have nothing in common with the harm he felt,
as made clear by his refusal to accept the prosecutor's deal. By
thinking of the cross-examination, rather than the verdict, as the re-
lief, however, we could make available a legally enabled experience
that shared structural and substantive elements with the experience
of harm.
G. The Disastrous Day of Trial
On the morning of trial we arrived at court early, armed with
our detailed jury instructions and trial brief. But yet another sur-
prise awaited us in this case. As soon as our case was called, the
prosecutor rose and said:
Your honor, in this case I've had an opportunity to talk to the
police officers about this case. I've reviewed it myself. I've made
the decision and the record should reflect it's solely my decision
that the People do not wish to proceed. We're moving to dismiss.
It's a 90 day, hundred dollar misdemeanor. Under the facts of the
case even if the Defendant were found guilty a nominal fine would
probably be the appropriate sentence. I don't see a great use to
the taxpayers of the State of Michigan to expend literally
thousands of dollars with police officer's time and overtime, wit-
ness fees, court time, to proceed in this particular case. And
again, it's fully my decision. Due to the nature of the case, also
due to the nature of other cases I have to have prepared by Mon-
day morning I would like to state that the police were ready to
proceed. They do not agree with my decision, that the witnesses
were in fact here this morning and this is over their objection, the
Michigan State Police. But I cannot justify a trial on the costs to
the taxpayers of the State of Michigan. 49
The judge responded as follows:
Well, I said on the record from the very beginning that there
was no question in my mind that it was an attitude ticket. I'm not
saying that that's even improper. The police officers do have a
good deal of discretion. We see it everyday. Sometimes they ex-
41) Dismissal at 3-4, People v. Johnson (No. 88 1205) (April 7, 1989) (on file with
Cornell Law Review) (the prosecutor on the day of trial was a different person than the
prosecutor at the evidentiary hearings).
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ercise it in a manner that we think is commendable, other times
we think that maybe they shouldn't have exercised it that way. But
nevertheless they do have discretion.
We give a man a badge and a gun and a bunch of training and
put him out on the street, we have to assume that they have some
discretion and give them some discretion to operate. I think this
was an attitude ticket. We see a lot of attitude tickets and um, no
question about it. If the person had behaved in a different man-
ner the ticket never would have happened and I don't find fault
with the Prosecutor in bringing it, I don't find fault with the Prose-
cutor in dismissing it.
[To the students] As a practical matter there are very few peo-
ple that would have spent the kind of time and effort and legal
talent to fight, as the Prosecutor has pointed out, a fifty dollar
attitude ticket. Very few people would have gone through the ef-
fort you did. But it's a great experience for you.50
It might have been a great experience for the students, but it
certainly was not for Dujon Johnson. I could tell that he was fum-
ing. His first words as he left the courtroom were "Patronizing, pa-
tronizing!" I decided to take advantage of the unexpected free time
that we all suddenly had in our morning schedule to "debrief" with
our client in the "lawyers only" lounge at the courthouse. What I
thought would be a 20 minute conversation turned into a deeply-
challenging, and for me soul-searching, exchange.
Immediately after we settled in the lawyers' lounge, Johnson
said,5' "I didn't get what I wanted. I'm very upset by this." The
students asked why he was not at least happy that he did not have a
conviction. The ensuing discussion led him, with my encourage-
ment, to talk about how he felt about our representation.
He said that our representation of him placed part of his life in
the control of someone other than himself. Too much of the case
had been out of his hands "from the get-go." "Sometimes I feel like
I'm not an adult, always responsible to someone else." He observed
that
the fact you are in law school makes you see differently. I can't
fault you guys for having more control over your life than I have;
this is my lot in life. The fact I had to come to you and I'm not
50 Id. at 9-11.
51 Of course, I do not have a recording or transcript of this conversation with our
client. What follows is a reconstruction taken almost directly from notes I made at the
time. The phrasing and sequence therefore may be slightly different than what actually
occurred.
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paying you, that fact alone means that I'm in the back-seat. 5 2
Even today during court this morning, I'm in the back-seat. 5 3 Al-
ways the secondary person.
He said that at times we had made him conscious that he was
different and specifically treated him as if he was "an indigent men-
tally as well as physically." He felt that this treatment suggested that
we expected him to exhibit a kind of "laziness, nonchalance." He
gave specific examples of conversations in which the students had
reminded him of the importance of attending various court dates.
He asked, "Why must I qualify myself, reveal my soul to you, con-
vince you that I wasn't there for good reasons?" 54
Our client then spoke more directly about how it seemed we
were treating him "differently."
I have a big thing about respect. Sometimes it was as if you were
talking to a child, trying to make me understand as if I had no
common sense .... Do you guys actually think I'm stupid, lazy
and slow? Most black people have that stereotype, of being that
way. You don't know that?... The way you guys talk to me and
approach me- it's a little like the way Trooper Kiser approached
me.
Up to this point, Johnson had been speaking primarily to the
two student attorneys. But he then turned his attention to me.
You're the kind of person who usually does the most harm. You
have a guardian mentality, assume that you know the answer. You
presume you know the needs and the answers. Oversensitivity.
Patronizing.5 5 All the power is vested in you. I think you may go
too far, assuming that you would know the answer.
52 As I recall, Johnson made this point literally by stating that whenever he and the
students travelled in the same car, the two students sat in the front seat while he rode in
the back. There had been several such trips because the students had offered to pick
Johnson up at the bus station in Ann Arbor and take him to court.
53 By this statement,Johnson was referring to the fact that he was sitting behind the
bar in the audience section rather than at counsel table when the prosecutor moved to
dismiss and the judge responded. I cannot recall why this was the seating arrangement.
Certainly we would have had our client seated with us for the trial. Perhaps we forgot to
make room forJohnson at the table when the case was called and were too surprised by
the prosecutor's motion to explicitly invite Johnson to cross the bar and join us. I will
confess it never occurred to me to ask Johnson if he wanted to respond to the prosecu-
tor's motion himself or to speak directly to the judge.
54 Apparently Johnson was referring, at least in part, to a telephone conversation
with one of the student attorneys in which the student encouraged him to attend the
hearing during which the troopers would be examined and to a later telephone discus-
sion when one of the students asked him why he failed to appear for that hearing. See
supra note 31.
55 This was the second time that day Johnson had used the word "patronizing."
The first time was in reference to the judge's speech in the courtroom. See supra p. 1329.
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And here the story ends, at least the story of my efforts to rep-
resent Dujon Johnson. 56 After the symposium, but before the trial
date I had thought of changing that earlier article into A Tale of Three
Clients, by addingJohnson's case to illustrate how the translation ap-
proach could be applied. But faced with Johnson's devastating cri-
tique, I quickly changed the title back to A Tale of Two Clients. I was
hesitant to assume "that I knew the answer"; indeed, I was sure I did
not understand "what had happened" well enough to write about it.
But in a sense, the story has continued, as I have presented this
case to various audiences, thought about it, and finally attempted to
write about it. The next sections tell the story of my struggle to
understand what happened, and thereby test the translation meta-
phor as a way of both thinking about and changing the way I prac-
tice law.
II
TRANSLATION AS A METAPHOR FOR LAWYERING
My ideas for describing the practice of law as a kind of transla-
tion have their foundation in a very simplified theory of knowledge.
This theory uses a model of mental activity divided into three sepa-
rate levels: sensation, experience, and knowledge. In this model,
the level of sensation consists of the raw input from the external
world, the complex pattern of nerve impulses from the sensory or-
gans. This is the lowest level of animate being; pure sensation can
stimulate an animate response but cannot be consciously exper-
ienced in that form. In order for sensation to rise to the level of
experience it must be sorted and structured in relation to independ-
ent forms of intuition. For example, the impulses from the optic
nerve are sensation; visual perception is experience. We perceive
an object as having a certain shape, size, and position, all in relation
to an inherently assumed space.57
Instead of a sharp dichotomy between an external "real" world
and an internal "subjective" world, this model postulates a dynamic
relation. The internal world we experience is constituted out of sense
56 On that last day, we did discuss with Johnson the possibility of a civil rights suit
against the troopers. He was quite interested in such a suit; unfortunately, we had to tell
him later that our clinic was not able to take on that kind of litigation. I did contact the
director of the Michigan ACLU, who indicated they might be interested in assisting
Johnson. Two months after the trial date, I left Michigan to take my current job, but I
wrote a long letter toJohnson referring him to both the ACLU and several private attor-
neys who did civil rights litigation. I also said in that letter that I had called both the
Michigan Civil Rights Commission and the Intra-departmental Affairs Office of the state
police and had been told that both agencies would review any complaint he filed with
them regarding the arrest.
57 See I ERNST CASSIRER, PHILOSOPHY OF SYMBOLIC FORMS 100-01 (Ralph Manheim
trans., 1953).
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data derived from the external world. A similar relation is proposed
linking the levels of experience and knowledge. Knowledge is
neither independent of nor simply dependent on experience; rather,
the conceptual world is constituted out of the elements of
experience.
In this model, language plays a central role in the constitution
of knowledge out of experience. The very process of naming
reduces the particularity of experience to reveal inherent factors of
form and relation, and then formalizes and stabilizes them.58
This model differs from both empiricism and idealism. It as-
serts that concepts are neither abstracted from empirical objects nor
derived from transcendent ideals, but rather are realized in the pro-
cess of objectifying experience. By giving a name to experience,
consciousness frees itself from passive captivity to sensation and ex-
perience and creates a world of its own, a world of representation.
It is this world of representations that we "think" about and com-
municate to others.
The world of representation, the realm of knowledge, is in a
dynamic relation with the world of experience. Initially, experience
gives rise to the concepts which can be known and communicated.
However, these forms of knowledge in turn may alter the way in
which we experience, just as the forms of intuition structure our
sensations.59 Under this model, "reality," as we know it, is neither
simply "out there" nor merely a social construction.60
One way I have attempted to explain this model of knowledge
to my students is to show them the following picture on an overhead
projector:
58 Id. at 281.
59 For discussion of a scientific experiment that appears to show language differ-
ences influencing actual perceptions of color, see Cunningham, supra note 41, at 2475-
79.
60 This rather simple epistemological model resembles in many ways Steven Win-
ter's experientialist approach, which I find very congenial. See Steven L. Winter, The
Cognitive Dimension of the Agon Between Legal Power and Narrative Meaning, 87 MICH. L. REV.
2225, 2230-55 (1989); Steven L. Winter, Transcendental Nonsense, Metaphoric Reasoning, and
the Cognitive Stakes for Law, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1105, 1152-59 (1989). Feminist epistemol-
ogy has played an important role in emphasizing to legal scholars the importance of
experience and context in conceptualization. See Bartlett & Goldfarb, infra note 63, and
sources cited therein.
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I ask them what they see in this picture; most respond that they see
nothing but a lot of lines. I then overlay a second transparancy with
the shape of a capital B highlighted in color:
FIGURE 3
Illlllll
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Next I repeat the process
shape of a capital E:
using a transparency highlighting the
FIGURE 4
Seeing a letter in the picture requires them to exclude part of
the picture and focus only on certain lines. Whether they see a B or
E depends on what they exclude and what they emphasize. These
letters are neither simply "in" the picture6 nor imposed on it by the
color frames. Rather the letters are constituted out of the bewilder-
ing array of lines through a process of selection and exclusion.
The "framing" metaphor created by this exercise, although
helpful in clarifying my abstract model of mental activity, 62 overem-
phasizes exclusion and deemphasizes the equally important concept
that language and other forms of knowledge add something in the
process of constituting experience. The framing metaphor also sug-
gests a unilateral progression from experience to knowledge rather
than a dynamic interaction in which the mind moves back and forth
61 One might suggest my illustration is fundamentally flawed because both letters
were "in" the picture before the framing exercises-I created the initial picture by over-
lapping pre-existing pictures of "B" and "E." Although I did create the picture in this
way (actually I also added pictures of "K" and "D"), students also plausibly saw other
patterns in the picture, such as "F" and "13," that I did not "put" there. Indeed, "13"
may be a more plausible pattern because to "see" the letter "B," one must "fill in" gaps
between the upright and horizontal strokes according the conventions of Gothic type-
face, while the gaps are consistent with the standard image of "13."
62 For an analogous use of "framing" to discuss the exclusionary nature of legal
narratives, see Scheppelle, supra note 42, at 2085.
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from experience to knowledge, always testing concepts against ex-
perience, the results of which in turn are used to create altered
concepts. 63
The idea of translation captures and communicates more of the
theoretical model than the narrower metaphor of framing. In apply-
ing the word "translation" to the practice of law,64 I have been influ-
enced by James Boyd White's presentation of translation as a
complex and creative practice requiring of the translator both high
art and a demanding ethic. White uses the etymology of "transla-
tion" (from the Latin "trans" (across) and "latus" (carried)) to illus-
trate what he considers a common but fundamental epistemological
mistake about the nature of language and translation. 65 To think of
translation as "carrying across," transportation, is to treat language
as if it were simply a vehicle for transporting invariable meanings
from the shores of one mind to another. But White persuasively
argues that meanings invariably change as part of the "trip" because
they do not exist apart from language. 66 Borrowing from the termi-
nology of the Spanish linguist Ortega y Gassett, White describes
every translation as involving two kinds of meaning transformation:
63 Katherine Bartlett has advocated a form of feminist epistemology she terms
"positionality" that similarly emphasizes a dynamic relationship between experience and
knowledge. See Katherine Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REV. 829, 880-87
(1990). Phyllis Goldfarb has applied such an epistemology to describe how the clinical
approach to legal education promotes the use of experience to develop and test theory.
See Phyllis Goldfarb, A Theory-Practice Spiral: The Ethics of Feminism and Clinical Education, 75
MINN. L. REV. 1599 (1991).
64 The translation metaphor is appearing more and more often in legal scholarship.
See, e.g., Gerald Lopez, supra note 4 at 11 (in lawyering, a representative "translates and,
if necessary, transforms" the story a person is living into a story that an audience "can
identify, believe and find compelling"); Lucie White, Mobilization on the Margins of the
Lawsuit: Making Space for Clients to Speak, 16 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 535, 544
(1987-88) (legal culture defines the attorney's core role "as that of a translator who
serves to shape her client's experiences into claims, arguments and remedies that both
the client and judge can understand"); Nancy Rourke, The Language of the Law: A Com-
ment on the Legitimacy of the Adversarial Trial, 1990 Annual Meeting of the Law & Society
Association 8 ("It is fairly widely acknowledged that lawyers engage in a process of
translation, changing the client's problem into a claim the law can recognize."). There
are strong similarities between the translation metaphor and the concept of "voice" in
feminist legal scholarship. See, e.g., Naomi R. Cahn, The Looseness of Legal Language: The
Reasonable Woman Standard in Theory and in Practice, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1398 (1992);
Lucinda Finley, Breaking Women 's Silence: The Dilemma of the Gendered .Vature of Legal Reason-
ing, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 886 (1989); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, "Portia in a Different
Voice: Speculations on a ll'omen s Lawveing Process, 1 BERKLEY WOMEN'S L.J. 39 (1985); Ann
C. Scales, Surviving Legal De-Education: An Outsider's Guide, 15 VERMONT L. REV. 139, 141,
144-45 (1990). For an interesting description by a linguistic anthropologist of legal
education as the teaching of a new language, see Susan Philips, The Language Socialization
of Layvers: Acquiring the "Cant ", in DOING THE ETHNOGRAPHY OF SCHOOLING 177 (G. Spin-
dler, ed. 1982).
65 JAMES BOYD WHITE, JUSTICE AS TRANSLATION 233-34 (1990).
66 Id. at 234-35.
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deficiency and exuberance. 67 Deficiencies are aspects of meaning of
the original expression not replicated in the translated expression;
exuberances are aspects of meaning that appear in the translation
but are not part of the original.6 8 Because, for White, meaning is
inextricable from language, to become aware of the deficiencies and
exuberances of a translation is to become aware of the limits and
potentialities of one's own mind and of the mind of another.
According to White, these epistemological implications of
translation make translation a model for a kind of ethic:
[Translation] recognizes the other-the composer of the original
text-as a center of meaning apart from oneself. It requires one
to discover both the value of the other's language and the limits of
one's own. Good translation thus proceeds not by motives of
dominance or acquisition, but by respect. It is a word for a set of
practices by which we learn to live with difference .... It is not
simply an operation of mind on material, but a way of being one-
self in relation to another being.... The activity of translation...
offers an education in what is required for [the] interactive life [of
lawyering], for ... to attempt to "translate" is to experience a
failure at once radical and felicitous: radical for it throws into
question our sense of ourselves, our languages, of others; felici-
tous, for it releases us momentarily from the prison of our own
ways of thinking and being.6 9
The following story of how the English word "lawyer" could
plausibly be translated as "translator" is intended to illustrate how
through translation one can recognize profound difference, respond
to that difference with imagination and mutual education, and ex-
pand the meaning of one or both languages.
Imagine an American lawyer visiting the court of the emperor
of China in 1800.70 Through a Mandarin translator, he starts to tell
the emperor that he is a lawyer, only to be informed by the transla-
tor that there is no word in Mandarin for "law." The closest ap-
proximation is the wordfu, meaning "punishment" or "sanction."' T
67 Id. at 235.
68 Id.
69 Id. at 257.
70 My assumption that an American lawyer in 1800 would describe the practice of
law as we would today is no doubt anachronistic. In fact, in the pre-Revolutionary pe-
riod, many colonies shared the Chinese attitude reflected in this story by barring lawyers
from court and prohibiting pleading for hire. LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF
AMERICAN LAw 81-82 (1973). However, by 1835, if we are to believe de Tocqueville,
lawyers enjoyed the highest status and influence in American society. ALEXIS DE Toc-
QUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 284-90 (1973).
71 In constructing this story I was assisted by my colleague, William Jones, a trans-
lator of Chinese legal texts. See A Translation of the General Provisions of Civil Law of the
People's Republic of China, 13 REV. SOCIALIST L. 357 (1987); Translation, Fourth Draft of the
Civil Code of the People's Republic of China, 10 REV. SOCIALIST L. 193 (1984).
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Thus, if the translator described the American as one who practices
fu, the emperor would assume that he was a judge, one who ad-
ministers punishment.
The American is encouraged to learn that at least the emperor
has a word for "judge," but the translator quickly informs him that a
better translation for the tide of the Chinese official who administers
fu would be "magistrate," because such officials exercise administra-
tive as well as judicial functions. 72 The American then asks the
translator if there is a word for a person who assists those appearing
before a magistrate. The translator replies there is, song-gun, but
suggests against using the word because it is a term of scorn, per-
haps similar to the word "shyster."'73 He explains to the puzzled
American that in Chinese "courts" the parties always represent
themselves. Illiterate persons often employed the services of a
scrivener, but these scriveners were generally prohibited from giv-
ing advice or trying to influence the magistrate's decision. A scriv-
ener who ignored such prohibitions was called a song-gun. Thus
there is no word for a professional court advocate, and indeed no
noun "advocate."
The translator asks the American to explain what exactly a law-
yer would do in a court. The American suddenly decides to use the
translator himself as an example, saying that as he helps the lawyer
explain himself to the emperor, so too the lawyer helps his client
explain his case to the judge. The language gap between the speak-
ers of different languages is thus bridged by a common experience:
the event that the emperor and the American are sharing at the very
moment. This move may be especially plausible in this context be-
cause for both Anglo-American and Chinese cultures there has been
a similar evolutionary relationship between the court of a ruler, lit-
erally the physical space where subjects can approach the ruler and
be heard (the space where the American is now located),74 and the
court of a judge (the space where he functions as a lawyer). For
both cultures "court" has shifted in meaning from a specific location
72 For a fascinating description of a Chinese Magistrate, see CELEBRATED CASES OF
JUDGE DEE, (Robert Vangulik trans., 1976)(anonymous 18th century detective novel
based on the legendary exploits of the famous Tang dynasty Judge Dee Jen-djieh (630-
700 A.D.)).
73 Jones, supra note 71, informs me that song-gun literally means "litigation stick,"
i.e., one who "stirs up" litigation. "Shyster" apparently entered the English language
around 1840, derived either from the name of a specific New York lawyer, Scheuster,
frequently rebuked for pettifoggery, see WEBSTER'S SEVENTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTION-
ARY (1967) "shyster" (at 306), or from the German word Scheisse, meaning excrement,
see STUART BERG FLEXNER, I HEAR AMERICA TALKING: AN ILLUSTRATED TREASURY OF
AMERICAN WORDS AND PHRASES 167 (1976).
74 Indeed, "Court" originally meant something like "yard," thus showing the com-
mon link among such diverse uses as "tennis court," "court of law," and "courtyard."
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in a ruler's residence to one of the key functions once performed in
such a space.
This exercise in translating "lawyer" might lead the American,
the Chinese translator and, through him, the emperor to a new un-
derstanding of what happens in their respective "law courts," by
suggesting the gap between the language used by the parties and
the language used by the judge might be large enough to require
the services of a "translator," even though both might have previ-
ously assumed that everyone in their respective courts was speaking
the "same language," either English or Mandarin.
The translation metaphor suggests that the introduction of a
"new word" (typically by expanding the meaning of an existing
word by using it in a novel way) can dramatically affect a person's
understanding of experience. Indeed, by discussing lawyering as a
kind of translation, I am myself using "translation" as a "new word"
in an effort to expand my understanding of my experience of prac-
ticing law. As linguist George Lakoff and philosopher MarkJohnson
have suggested, a novel metaphor can "defin[e] reality" 75 by making
"coherent a large and diverse range of experiences. ' 76 The process
they describe by which a metaphor "defines reality" by highlighting
"certain aspects of our experience" and-blocking others77 resembles
the model of mental activity discussed above. More recently, Lakoff
has suggested that metaphors create meaning primarily by "map-
ping" from one domain of experience to a corresponding concep-
tual structure in another domain of experience. 78 For example, the
American in my story "mapped" the domain of experience from ap-
pearance in a royal court onto the domain of the courtroom by tak-
ing advantage of structural and other similarities between the two
domains.
The translator's ethic compels a continuing cycle in which the
translator must continually confront the flaws of the expression he is
creating in the second language, return to the "other" in the first
language, and then begin the endeavor anew. 79 For White, this cy-
cle impels the translator toward a high art he terms: "integration:
putting two things together in such a way as to make a third, a new
thing with meaning of its own.., not to merge the two elements or
75 George Lakoff & Mark Johnson, Conceptual .Mletaphor in Everydayv Language, 77 J.
PHIL. 453 (1980). This article summarized ideas which are developed more thoroughly
in a book by the same authors, METAPHORS WE LIVE By (1980).
76 Id. at 484, 485.
77 Id. at 484.
78 GEORGE LAKOFF, WOMEN, FIRE, AND DANGEROUS THINGS: WHAT CATEGORIES RE-
VEAL ABotrr THE MIND 114 (1987).
79 This cycle resembles the "theory-practice spiral" discussed by Goldfarb, supra
note 63.
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blur the distinctions between them, but to sharpen the sense we
have of each, and of the differences that play between them."8 0 This
art must be constantly "remade afresh, in new forms."8'
Through the preceding narrative (and in my interpretations of
this story in Part IV) I hope to recreate my sense of having partici-
pated in such a cycle: of creating meaning only to discover its limits,
returning anew to discover what aspects of the client's experience
were excluded, trying again, failing again, yet trying once more. For
this reason I have told the story of representingJohnson as I under-
stood it at the time, which meant that some details of what hap-
pened were sometimes introduced not in chronological sequence,
but rather at a later point when they first developed meaning for me.
III
STUDYING TEXTS OF THE REPRESENTATION OF A CLIENT
A. The Roots of Ethnography in Cultural Anthropology
The metaphor of the lawyer as translator would seem to lead
naturally to the metaphor of "representation as text" if the client's
story is viewed as a text for the lawyer to translate for legal audi-
ences. "Text" also suggests an analogy to literary interpretation,
which is the primary disciplinary cross-fertilization that gives rise to
use of the translation metaphor by James Boyd White.8 2 Although
the methods of literary interpretation do influence this approach,
they are brought to bear through a circuitous route that begins in
cultural anthropology-and in the remote islands of Indonesia.
In thinking of my representation of Johnson as a text, I am tak-
ing as my model the practice of ethnography,8 3 initially developed in
cultural anthropology and since applied in a number of sociological
methodologies. A cultural anthropologist traditionally created an
ethnography by living in a foreign (usually exotic) society for an ex-
tended period. This "field work" involved becoming a "participant-
observer," participating in the daily life of the society as much as
80 WHrrE, supra note 65, at 263.
81 For me the translator's art of integration can be a useful metaphor for the kind of
multiple consciousness advocated by critical race theorists. See Delgado, supra note 14;
Matsuda, supra note 14; Patricia Williams, The Obliging Shell, 87 MIcH. L. REV. 2128, 2151
("It is this perspective, the ambi-valent, multivalent way of seeing that is, I think, at the
heart of what is called critical theory, feminist theory, and the so-called minority critique.
It has to do with a fluid positioning that sees back and forth across boundary.... Noth-
ing is simple. Each day is a new labor.").
82 Besides being a law professor, White is also a professor of English Literature.
83 Translating its Greek components literally, ethnography means "nation writing"
(ethnos-nation; graphein-to write) in the same way that geography means "earth writ-
ing." A geography of a country describes (writes down) its terrain and other physical
features; an ethnography of a country describes the people who live there.
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possible, sometimes by laboring in a specific indigenous work role,
while simultaneously observing all that was taking place around her.
A constant dialogue with co-operating members of the society, usu-
ally termed (unfortunately) "informants," supplemented these ob-
servations and clarified their significance.
The gap between the ethnographer and the society studied was
usually vast; many ethnographers arrived with almost no informa-
tion and did not even speak the language. If an ethnographer could
gain meaningful insight into a vastly different culture despite such
hurdles, then ethnographic methods might offer some hope for
crossing the apparently smaller gap between attorney and client.
The approach to ethnography I am taking as my model is that
practiced and explicated by Clifford Geertz, one of our most influ-
ential (and eloquent) contemporary cultural anthropologists.
Geertz starts with the premise that "[t]he ability of anthropologists
to get us to take what they say seriously ... [is primarily due to] their
capacity to convince us that what they say is a result of their having
actually penetrated ... another form of life, of having... truly 'been
there.' "84 The requirement that anthropological research be based
on field work gets the anthropologist "there"; the participant-ob-
server method ensures that she is intensively "being" while there.
But how can such a stranger in a strange land presume to "pene-
trate" the very foreign life being lived around her?
The trick is not to get yourself into some inner correspondence of
spirit with your informants.... The ethnographer does not, and,
in my opinion largely cannot, perceive what his informants per-
ceive. What he perceives .. .is what they perceive "with." ...
[For example, in] my own work ... I have been concerned, among
other things, with attempting to determine how ... people...
define themselves as persons, what goes into the idea they have
... of what a self.., is. And in each case, I have tried to get at this
most intimate of notions not by imagining myself someone else, a
rice peasant or a tribal sheikh, and then seeing what I thought, but
by searching out and analyzing the symbolic forms-words,
images, institutions, behaviors-in terms of which, in each place,
people actually represented themselves to themselves and to one
another.8 5
For example, in perhaps his most famous ethnographic essay,86
Geertz studies the practice of cockfighting on the Indonesian island
84 CLIFFORD GEERTZ, WORKS AND LIvEs: THE ANTHROPOLOGIST As AUTHOR 4-5
(1988).
85 CLIFFORD GEERTZ, LOCAL KNOWLEDGE: FURTHER ESSAYS IN INTERPRETIVE AN-
THROPOLOGY 58 (1983) (emphasis added).
86 CLIFFORD GEERTZ, Deep Play: Notes on the Balinese Cockfight, in THE INTERPRETATION
OF CULTURES 412 (1973).
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of Bali. After carefully describing cockfighting as a sport-inven-
torying its rules, strategies and techniques-and its role in the social
economy through the complex systems of gambling that surround
such fights, Geertz moves to a consideration of the cockfight as an
art form, comparable to a play or poem. 7 He assumes that by par-
ticipating in a cockfight, the Balinese are saying something, about
themselves to themselves.88 Thus, interpreting the cockfight need
not be an imposition of the anthropologist's foreign concepts be-
cause the cockfight is already inherently meaningful. "To put the
matter this way ... shifts the analysis of cultural forms from an en-
deavor in general parallel to dissecting an organism, diagnosing a
symptom, deciphering a code, or ordering a system ... to one in
general parallel with penetrating a literary text."8 9 Geertz thus
imagines culture itself as an "ensemble of texts .. .which the an-
thropologist strains to read over the shoulders of those to whom
they properly belong." 90
The twin metaphors-culture as text and ethnography as liter-
ary interpretation-inform ethnographic methodology as described
by Geertz. For him, the "graphic," i.e. the "writing," aspect of eth-
nography is key: "What does the ethnographer do?-he writes." 9 1
It is not sufficient simply to observe and participate in the events
"there"; by meticulously recording these cultural events, the eth-
nographer transforms their figurative texts into literal texts that can
be given the close and recurrent attention needed for the interpre-
tive process.
[There are four characteristics of ethnographic description:] it is
interpretive; what it is interpretive of is the flow of social dis-
course; .. .the interpreting involved consists in trying to rescue
87 Id. at 445, 450.
88 Geertz finds the cockfight richly evocative. He regards it as saying many things
in complex, interrelated ways, like a Shakespearean play. Among other things, the cock-
fight says that a Balinese man, socialized to be subdued and controlled, especially in
conflict, is "at heart" full of passion capable of exploding into the kind of murderous
rage exemplified by one cock hacking another into pieces with beak and claw; it also says
that the status relationships which are portrayed in the complex patterns of cockfight
betting are, like the fight itself, "matters of life and death." Id. at 446, 447. If Americans
"go to see Macbeth to learn what a man feels like after he has gained a kingdom and lost
his soul, Balinese go to cockfights to find out what a man, usually composed, aloof,
almost obsessively self-absorbed ... feels like when, attacked, tormented, challenged,
insulted, and driven in result to the extremes of fury, he has totally triumphed or been
brought totally low." Id. at 450.
89 Id. at 448.
90 Id. at 452.
91 CLIFFORD GEERTZ, Thick Description, in THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 3, 19
(1973).
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the "said" of such discourse from its perishing occasions and fix it
in perusable terms .. .[and]; it is microscopic. 9 2
The goal of this methodology is to produce what Geertz calls "thick
descriptions," which both record specific events in their complex
particularity and evoke the varied nuances of their symbolic import.
The important thing about such descriptions "is their complex spe-
cificness, their circumstantiality." 93 They are "not privileged, just
particular; another country heard from."'94
Although the production of thick description is necessarily in-
terpretive, the interpretation does not become more certain as the
description thickens. 95 Rather, the more fully the ethnographer
evokes an event "there" the more complex becomes its potential
meaning and the more resistant the event becomes to explanatory
paraphrase. Likewise, a good interpretation of Macbeth does not
produce a self-apparent simple truth, a clear "moral of the story,"
but rather shows the play to be even more mysterious and subtle
than it appeared before. What thick description can achieve,
though, whether of a cockfight or a play, is the expansion of the
imagination.96
Although ethnographic methodology was developed to de-
scribe cultures alien to the ethnographer and her audience, social
scientists have increasingly applied its techniques to their own socie-
ties. As Geertz explains, participant-observation of exotic cultures
is essentially a device for displacing the dulling sense of familiarity
with which the mysteriousness of our own ability to relate percep-
tively to another is concealed from us. Looking at the ordinary in
places where it takes unaccustomed forms brings out... the de-
gree to which meaning varies according to the pattern of life by
which it is informed. 97
The very distance between the ethnographer and the people she
studies enables the ethnographer to discern what Geertz terms "ex-
perience-near concepts," concepts that a member of the society
"might himself naturally and effortlessly use to define what he or his
fellows see, feel, think, imagine, and so on, and which he would
readily understand when similarly applied by others."98 Because
92 Id. at 20-21.
93 Id. at 23.
94 Id.
95 "Cultural analysis is intrinsically incomplete [and] the more deeply it goes the
less complete it is .... [Its] most telling assertions are its most tremulously based." Id.
at 29.
96 "[T]he aim of anthropology is the enlargement of the universe of human dis-
course." Id. at 14. "To write ethnography ... [is to] enlarge the sense of how life can
go." GEERTZ, supra note 84, at 139.
97 Id. at 14.
98 GEERTZ, supra note 85, at 57.
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such concepts are so "near" to people, they tend not to be con-
sciously aware of their complex conceptual nature. "People use ex-
perience-near concepts spontaneously, unself-consciously ....
That is what experience-near means-that ideas and the realities
they inform are naturally and indissolubly bound up together." 99
In his endeavor to understand the idea of selfhood in three dif-
ferent societies 00-Javanese, Balinese, and Moroccan-Geertz re-
lies heavily on such experience-near concepts as: the idea of a
bounded self with distinction between "inside/outside" (batin/lair)
for the Javanese; the fear of inept public performance-"shame"
(lek)-for the Balinese; and the varying familial, tribal, and commu-
nal affiliations all expressed through use of the Arabic linguistic
form nisba for the Moroccans. 1 1
In these ethnographic descriptions, like most of his others, 10 2
Geertz focuses on semantic explication of what I would call key
words: batin, lek, nisba.'03 This conjunction of linguistic and ethno-
graphic description is not coincidental. Ethnographic methodology
owes much to the techniques of descriptive linguistics developed
before and during the rise of anthropology as an academic
discipline.
The descriptive linguist faced the challenge of developing
"techniques which would enable the linguist to overcome his own
perceptual limitations so as to discover the system of a second lan-
guage."' 0 4 He could not simply ask a native speaker to explain the
language's phonetics or grammar, because such linguistic con-
straints "operate largely below the level of consciousness."' 1 5 The
ability of native speakers to produce well-formed utterances and to
recognize whether other utterances are well-formed, termed "com-
petence" by linguists, appears to be based on knowledge of a com-
plex rule system, like the ability to make correct moves in chess or
bids in bridge. Nevertheless, the competent speaker may be quite
unable to explicate any such rules. People can and do speak gram-
matically without ever learning a single rule of grammar. 10 6
99 Id. at 58.
100 See supra text accompanying note 88.
101 GEERTZ, supra note 85, at 59-68.
102 For example, see Geertz's comparative description of what "law" means in Mo-
rocco, Java, and Bali. Id. at 184-214.
103 In attempting to translate words that are so complexly bound to their cultural
context as to seemingly defy translation, Geertz is demonstrating for us the translator's
art and ethic.
104 JohnJ. Gumperz, Introduction, in DIRECTIONS IN SOCIOLINGUIsTIcs: THE ETHNOG-
RAPHY OF COMMUNICATION 6 (JohnJ. Gumperz & Dell Hymes, eds., 1972).
105 Id.
106 Recurrent differences in grammatical usage between two groups who speak the
"same" language signal the existence of different dialects, not linguistic incompetence
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Nonetheless, the descriptive linguists learned to make effective
use of speakers' competence through a variety of interactive tech-
niques in which the linguist would first guess at a rule from an ap-
parent pattern in his recorded observance and then test it by
generating a new utterance according to that rule and asking a na-
tive speaker whether it was well-formed. Many native "informants"
developed sophisticated insights into their own languages through
this interactive process and could increasingly assist the linguist in
determining why apparent exceptions to the hypothesized rules led
the way to a deeper consistency.' 0 7 The linguist's work was con-
stantly driven by the expectation that even seemingly arbitrary
speech patterns reflect inherent, meaningful structure of which
speaker competence was both evidence and product.
The resulting linguistic descriptions were not simply "found"
in either the empirical speech data observed or the conscious knowl-
edge systems of the native speakers. They were constructed by the
intellectual collaboration of linguist and native informant, yet they
arose from and were testable against empirical speech events. Thus,
the accomplishments of descriptive linguistics are a powerful exam-
ple of the dynamic interaction between experience and concepts as-
sumed by the model of mental activity described above.' 08
Linguists generally believe that semantic structure is product of
the same kind of unreflective speaker competence as phonetics (pro-
nunciation) and syntax (grammar).10 9 Recording and studying dif-
ferent uses of what appears to be the same "word" and testing
inductive guesses by interaction with a native speaker may make ex-
plicit a complex system of meaning that the speaker can manage but
not necessarily articulate unaided. Geertz's thick descriptions can
be viewed as an extension of this technique: elaborate and eloquent
semantic descriptions of the key words-the experience-near con-
cepts-by which members of a society express themselves. 10
on the part of one group (e.g., the use of "I is" instead of "I am" among many African-
Americans or the omission of "the" before "hospital" among the British).
107 "The process thus involves learning for both the linguist and the informant."
Gumperz, supra note 104, at 7.
108 See supra text accompanying notes 57-81.
109 For further discussion of semantic competence and an example of the applica-
tion of such competence to analyze the interpretation of legal texts, see Clark D. Cun-
ningham, A Linguistic Analysis of the Meanings of "Search" in the Fourth Amendment: A Search
for Common Sense, 73 IoWA L. REv. 541 (1988).
110 Anthropologist Charles Frake explicitly applies the techniques of descriptive lin-
guistics in his "thick description" of litigation among the Yakan people of the Philip-
pines. Charles 0. Frake, Struck by Speech: The Yakan Concept of Litigation, in DIRECTIoNs IN
SOCIOLINGUIsTICS, supra note 104, at 106 (leading some commentators to describe his
study as "ethnographic semantics").
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B. From Ethnography to Ethnomethodology
The recent application of ethnographic methods to the study of
American and British legal discourse owes much to the blend of lin-
guistics and ethnography known as ethnomethodology. 111
Ethnomethodology extends the techniques of descriptive linguistics
to speech events such as conversations or group decisionmaking
which are more complex than single utterances on the assumption
that the social categories that produce and manage such interactions
are in essence semantic categories.' 1 2 These larger units of speech
are often termed "discourse." For some, entire ways of talking that
characterize a profession or discipline can be analyzed as a unitary
form of discourse.1 13
Ethnomethodology extends ethnography by treating the re-
searcher's own society as the subject of study on the premise that
ethnographic techniques can render the researcher's own "seen but
unnoticed" competence sufficiently "strange" for explication and
analysis. The distinct challenge for studying ethnomethodology is
that the researcher is a member of the same "folk" as the subjects
of the study and thus, initially, also "takes for granted" these com-
plex reasoning processes. Therefore, a basic principle of
ethnomethodology is that all the material studied is treated from the
outset as "anthropologically strange":
1 11 Interestingly, ethnomethodology has its origin in the famous Chicago Law
School empirical study ofjury deliberations. See HARRY KALVEN,JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE
AMERICAN JURY (1966). Sociologist Harold Garfinkel, a part of the team, became in-
trigued while studying tapes of the jurors' deliberations which involved use of what ap-
peared to be very sophisticated methods of lay reasoning distinct from, yet functionally
equivalent to, the legal reasoning used by the lawyers and the judge. In coming to an
agreement among themselves as to "what actually happened" the jurors found "ways of
reaching, within finite time limits, a series of decisions which are not only very complex,
but are also ofjust the sort that have provided central and elusive problematic for gener-
ations of philosophers and social scientists." Anita Pomerantz & J. Maxwell Atkinson,
Ethnomethodology, Conversation Analysis, and the Study of Courtroom Interaction, in PSYCHOLOGY
AND LAW 283, 285 (DaveJ. Muller et al. eds., 1984); see also Harold Garfinkel, The Origins
of the Term 'Ethnomethodology, 'in ETHNOMETHODOLOGY: SELECTED READINGS (Roy Turner
ed., 1974). Garfinkel coined the term "ethnomethodology" to describe this "folk meth-
odology," the methods used by members of a community in everyday living "to analyze,
make sense of, and produce recognizable social activities." Pomerantz & Atkinson,
supra, at 286. These methods are "taken-for-granted" in their use, "seen but unnoticed"
by the members themselves. Id.
112 Gumperz, supra note 104, at 15, 18.
113 See CONLEY & O'BARR, supra note 10, at 2; SALLY ENGLE MERRY, GETrINGJUSTICE
AND GETrING EVEN: LEGAL CONSCIOUSNESS AMONG WORKING-CLASS AMERICANS 110-15
(1990); Naomi R. Cahn, Speaking Differences: The Rules and Relationships of Litigants' Dis-
courses, 90 MICH. L. REv. 1705 (1992) (book review); Susan V. Philips, The Social Organiza-
tion of Questions and Answers in Courtroom Discourse: A Study of Changes of Plea in an Arizona
Court, 4 TEXT 225, 226 (1984).
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analysts must be willing to treat even the most apparently mun-
dane or ordinary events as puzzling enough to be worthy of seri-
ous analytic attention. Otherwise, they too [like the subjects
studied] are likely to overlook, or take for granted, the very prac-
tices that they are aiming to identify and describe."14
The student of ethnomethodology renders the mundane
"strange" by applying the same techniques used by the ethnogra-
pher of the exotic: meticulous recording of naturally occurring
events and microscopic analysis of the resulting "text." This "mi-
croanalysis"11 5 operates on an assumption similar to that which un-
derlies both linguistic and ethnographic description: the activity
studied has an inherent order that is created by the participants and
can be revealed by close and repeated examination, even though the
participants themselves may not be aware of this order. Thus, this
method paradoxically treats the commonplace as strange in order to
make it explicable.
For example, much ethnomethodological research has focused
on conversation analysis, including such apparently mundane issues
as "turn-taking," the ways speakers alternate speech so that they are
not speaking simultaneously. Although speakers may not be con-
sciously aware of using a system for taking turns, microanalysis of
recorded conversations reveals a consistent and complex pattern of
orderliness created by the speakers to make their communication
coherent.116
The emphasis on how participants themselves produce and in-
terpret each other's actions leads to two'distinctive features of
ethnomethodological research. First, the research focuses on how
human behavior works, rather than why such behavior occurs. Sec-
ond, theoretical conclusions are radically inductive because the re-
search is dictated by what the participants themselves are doing and
how they do it rather than by a pre-existing hypothesis that is tested
against the data. 1 7 These features are analogous to Geertz's ap-
proach in which he studies an event such as a cockfight, not as direct
evidence of a cultural trait, but as an expression by that culture's
members of their own understanding of their traits.
One of the most interesting and, for my purposes, suggestive
examples of conversation analysis is linguist Deborah Tannen's
study of American male-female conversation described recently in a
114 Pomerantz & Atkinson, supra note 111, at 287.
115 See DouGLAs W. MAYNARD, INSIDE PLEA BARGAINING 11, 199-200 (1984).
116 See, e.g., Emannuel A. Schegloff, Sequencing in Conversational Openings, in DIREC-
TIONS IN SOCIOLINGUISTICS, supra note 104, at 346.
117 Pomerantz & Atkinson, supra note 11, at 286-87.
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popularized version entitled You Just Don't Understand. 118 She suc-
ceeds in making what might seem most familiar, the speech of one's
own spouse, "anthropologically strange." Her meticulous examina-
tion of apparently thousands of male-female conversations persua-
sively reveals that American men and women speak in sufficiently
different ways which she terms "genderlects."' 19
Tannen does not study male-female conversation to assemble
evidence that men dominate women. Rather, her work shows how
language behavior may result in domination even absent intent to
dominate. 120 Even men and women striving in good faith to create
a nondominant relationship often have great difficulty because of
the differences in their genderlects. 12 1 Without rejecting the many
118 DEBORAH TANNEN, YOU JUST DON'T UNDERSTAND: WOMEN AND MEN IN CONVER-
SATION (1990).
119 Tannen obviously creates this term out of "gender" and "dialect." Id. at 42. For
example, if a husband says to his wife, "I just want to be more independent," the key
word "independent" is likely to have different meanings for husband and wife. The
husband may mean, "I don't want to be controlled, I want to be free." The wife, how-
ever, may hear, "I am denying our relationship, I want to be out on my own." Tannen
attributes this difference to a general pattern that emerges from her research. Men tend
to treat conversations as negotiations in which people try to achieve and maintain the
upper hand and protect themselves from being put down by others; this way of talking
reflects a view of the world as a hierarchical social order. Id. at 24-25. Women tend to
treat conversations as negotiations for closeness in which people seek and give confir-
mation and support and protect themselves from being pushed away; this reflects a
world view in which the individual is part of a network of connections. Id. at 25. From
the man's viewpoint, life is a contest, a struggle to preserve independence and avoid
failure. From the woman's perspective, life is a community, a struggle to preserve inti-
macy and avoid isolation. Id. at 24-25. Although acknowledging similarities to the work
of Carol Gilligan, e.g., IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (1982), Tannen maintains that her analysis
derives directly from her own sociolinguistic data. TANNEN, supra note 118, at 300 n.25.
Tannen suggests that even men and women who grow up in the same family may
learn different ways of speaking and hearing, because boys and girls tend to spend most
of their formative language acquisition time in same-sex play groups. Ethnographic
study of such play groups shows that the forms of play differ greatly, resulting in differ-
ent uses of language. Boys tend to play outside in large groups that are hierarchically
structured around a leader who tells the other boys what to do and how to do it, and
tend to negotiate status by giving orders. Play revolves around games with winners and
losers, and language is often employed in elaborate discussion of rules. In contrast,
girls tend to play in small groups or pairs. Their games, such as jump rope, hopscotch
and playing house, are co-operative rather than competitive. Girls measure status by
relative closeness; a girl is more likely to strive to be another's best friend rather than
the leader of a group. Girls who give orders are likely to be rejected as "bossy," so
preferences are usually expressed as suggestions. Girls thus tend to use language to
create closeness rather than control. Id. at 43-44.
Tannen's work is reminiscent of Geertz's ethnography in that its microscopic analy-
sis of recorded daily events reveals more and more about entire world views as it be-
comes more detailed. Like Geertz, she identifies key words (intimacy, independence) as
important to participants themselves. And like Geertz, she is primarily interested in ex-
panding the imagination.
120 Id. at 18.
121 Id. at 16.
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nonlinguistic factors influencing male-female domination, Tannen
offers a partial diagnosis and remedy for unintended domination.
By using the metaphor of cross-cultural, even cross-language com-
munication, Tannen avoids attribution of blame and keeps open the
possibility of mutual change and mutual growth:
Taking a cross-cultural approach to male-female conversations
makes it possible to explain why dissatisfactions are justified with-
out accusing anyone of being wrong or crazy. Learning about
style differences won't make them go away, but it can banish mu-
tual mystification and blame.' 22
Just as the ethnographer need not learn to think "like a native" to
expand her own understanding, one need not acquire the ability to
speak the other gender's language in order to improve
communication.
Can genderlect be taught? .... [A] more realistic approach is to
learn how to interpret each other's messages and explain your
own in a way your partner can understand and accept. Under-
standing genderlects makes it possible to change-to try speaking
differently-when you want to. But even if no one changes, un-
derstanding genderlect improves relationships. . . . Once they
know that men and women often have different assumptions
about the world and about ways of talking, people are very crea-
tive about figuring out how this rift is affecting their own
relationships. 123
Application of this ethnographic method to the attorney-client
relationship might offer similar promise to remedying patterns of
domination, control, and incomprehension that persist even when
the attorney is consciously attempting to develop an open, listening,
"client-centered" relationship. The attorney would begin by treat-
ing the client's account as "anthropologically strange," ideally by
recording it verbatim for later close study. This structured act of
distancing preserves the possibility that the client's ways of under-
standing and speaking may be significantly different from the attor-
ney's. To the extent that both share similar methods for creating
order and attributing significance to events, close reading may make
these implicitly shared ways of thinking explicit, thus highlighting
areas of difference. The recognition of difference focuses the law-
yer's attention on the "text" created by the client with the goal of
interpreting the meaning it already has for the client. What the cli-
ent says would never be treated as naive, disorganized, or ill-in-
formed, mere raw material needing the attorney's sophisticated
expertise to give it shape and significance. Rather, the lawyer would
122 Id. at 47-48.
123 Id. at 296, 297.
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assume that the client's account had its own inherent order and
complex interlocking meanings worthy of rapt and disciplined atten-
tion. In particular the lawyer would search for key words that might
reveal the particularities of the client's world view as focused in this
account.
The metaphor of representation as text suggests not only a lit-
eral transcription of the attorney-client interaction, but also the ini-
tial distancing of that activity from one participant-the attorney-
so that he can also become an observer. Once the activity is textual-
ized so that it can be examined other than in the attorney's memory,
so that it is presented in a stable form with inherent, autonomous
meaning, then it can be brought close again, close enough for mi-
croscopic examination.
C. Ethnographic Methodologies for Studying Legal Discourse
Recent sociolinguistic studies of legal discourse tend to fall into
two categories.1 24 One type tends to be quantitative: researchers
code and count recurrent formal speech features across a wide sam-
ple of recorded discourse and then correlate the results either to
identify features distinctive from everyday discourse or to test hy-
potheses regarding the social effect of formal speech forms. 125 The
second type is more qualitative, showing the influence of ethnogra-
phy and ethnomethodology: a smaller set of recorded discourse-
sometimes only one speech event-is read closely and repeatedly to
identify features apparently significant to the speakers rather than to
a researcher's pre-existing theory.' 26 Features cannot be coded be-
cause the researcher does not know which features are significant or
recurrent before coming to the text and because her theoretical un-
124 For a similar taxonomy, see MAYNARD, supra note 115, at 5-9; Donald Brenneis,
Language and Disputing, 17 ANN. REV. ANTHROPOLOGY 221, 228-29 (1988); R. Dunstan,
Contexts or Coercion: Analyzing Properties of Courtroom "Questions, "7 BRITISHJ. L. & Soc'Y 61
(1980).
125 See, e.g., WILLIAM M. O'BARR, LINGUISTIC EVIDENCE (1982);John M. Conley et al.,
The Power of Language, 1978 DUKE LJ. 1375; Brenda Danet & Bryna Bogoch, Fixed Fight or
Free-for-All? An Empirical Study of Combativeness in the Adversary System ofJustice, 7 BRITISH J.
L. & Soc'Y 36 (1980); Philips, supra note 113.
126 See, e.g., Michael H. Agar, Political Talk, in POWER THROUGH DISCOURSE (Leah
Kedar ed., 1987);J. MAXWELL ATKINSON & PAUL DREW, ORDER IN COURT: THE ORGANI-
SATION OF VERBAL INTERACTION IN JUDICIAL SETTINGS (1979); CONLEY & O'BARR, supra
note 10; Dunstan, supra note 124; Tamar Liebes-Plesner, Rhetoric in the Service ofJustice, 4
TEXT 173 (1984); MAYNARD, supra note 115; MERRY, supra note 113; Beatrice Caesar-
Wolf, The Construction of "Adjudicable" Evidence in a West German Civil Hearing, 4 TEXT 193
(1984); Pomerantz & Atkinson, supra note 111; Austin Sarat & William L.F. Felstiner,
Law and Strategy in the Divorce Lawyer's Office, 20 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 93 (1986).
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derstanding shifts constantly as insights are gained and tested with
each new reading.' 27
The latter approach is not unlike the "moving classification sys-
tem" of common law reasoning:
[T]he classification changes as the classification is made. The
rules change as the rules are applied. More important, the rules
arise out of a process which, while comparing fact situations, cre-
ates the rules and then applies them. 128
From my perspective the similarity is not accidental: one can view
both common-law reasoning and the ethnographic approach to in-
terpreting events as specialized instances of the dynamic relation be-
tween experience and knowledge that is fundamental to all thought.
The anthropologist-law professor team of William M. O'Barr
and John Conley at the Duke-University of North Carolina Law and
Language Project have conducted perhaps the most extensive eth-
nographic research into legal discourse. 129 Their most recently re-
ported research, on the discourse of small claims litigation, provides
a useful example of current ethnographic methodology for studying
legal discourse. First, they interviewed plaintiffs at the time they
filed their pro se complaints. 130 The observation and tape record-
ing of small claims trials formed the core of their research; they re-
corded 48 days of trials and collected a total of 466 cases (not all of
which went to trial). Finally they interviewed a number of the liti-
gants approximately a month after their cases concluded.
They adapted the group analytic method, commonly used by
conversation analysts, for studying the small claims trial tran-
scripts.' 3 ' A group composed of Conley, O'Barr and usually three
or four others trained in law, social science, or both would listen to a
tape segment (typically a single witness's testimony or the bench
opinion) while following along on the transcript. They would play
the tape repeatedly (sometimes five or six times) until all group
members were satisfied they had heard it enough; then all would
write detailed notes focusing on what each thought was important to
127 See CONLEY& O'BARR,SUpra note 10, atxiii; MAYNARD, Supra note 115, at4-13, 18-
21; Dunstan, supra note 124.
128 EDWARD LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 3 (1949).
129 O'Barr is on the anthropology faculty at Duke University; Conley teaches at the
University of North Carolina Law School and has a PhD in anthropology as well as a law
degree. In addition to their own extensive work, Conley and O'Barr edit a new series of
publications from the University of Chicago Press entitled Law and Legal Discourse.
130 They also attempted to conduct pretrial interviews with defendants but were
generally unsuccessful because the defendants did not have to come to court before trial
and were generally unreceptive to interviews at home. Id. at x-xi.
131 See William M. O'Barr &John M. Conley, Litigant Satisfaction versus Legal Adequacy
in Small Claims Court Narratives, in LANGUAGE IN THEJUDICIAL PROCESS 97, 108 n.9 (Judith
N. Levi & Anne Graffam Walker eds., 1990).
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the speaker on the tape. They would then present these observa-
tions in a roundtable discussion. The entire process typically lasted
two hours.13 2
Although acknowledging that this method seems "deceptively
simple," Conley and O'Barr assert that it is nonetheless intensely
empirical. 13 3 They see the open-ended insights of the group partici-
pants as actualizing the participants' inherent competence as native
speakers by forcing the participants to make explicit their implicit
processes of interpreting the text.'34 Conley and O'Barr report a
striking consensus among session participants in identifying and
agreeing on issues of interest in a given text, even from members
not previously involved in the research project.' 35 More important,
though, than the consensus among researchers is the fact that Con-
ley and O'Barr provide their readers with the same texts so that each
reader can test the researchers' interpretations against the reader's
own competence as an interpreter of speech events. Finally, Conley
and O'Barr describe their method as intensely empirical because, in
a sense, the litigants themselves set the research agenda; what ap-
pears important to them, rather than to the researchers, is the focus
of analysis.13 6
The inductive nature of Conley and O'Barr's method is exem-
plified by the way their research changed their very idea of the na-
ture of a dispute. Their original design, in seeking to capture early
"uncontaminated" accounts of disputes before they reached the
courthouse, presumed that a dispute had a concrete, essential na-
ture independent of the various accounts of that dispute. 137 How-
ever, their research brought them to conclude
that at any particular point in time the dispute is the account being
given at that time. Each new account that the disputants give...
reflects somewhat different understandings, beliefs and emphases.
Thus, any account is both determined by what has gone before
and determinative of the present and future shape of the
dispute. 13 8
Conley and O'Barr distinguish their approach from both tradi-
tional ethnography and conversation analysis.' 3 9 Although they
132 CONLEY & O'BARR, supra note 10, at xii, 35; see id. at 108.
133 Id. at xi.
134 Conley & O'Barr, supra note 131, at 109.
135 CONLEY & O'BARR, supra note 10, at xii.
136 Id. "In listening to litigants' accounts, we have concentrated on what they say
and how they say it rather than trying to impose predetermined structures and catego-
ries on the data." Id. at xi.
137 Id. at x.
138 Id.
139 Id. at xi-xii.
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share with ethnographers an emphasis on careful, detailed observa-
tion and inductive analysis, Conley & O'Barr differ from traditional
ethnographers in that they observe and analyze language use as the
object of their study, while most ethnographers view language as a
window through which to view cultural attitudes. Although Conley
and O'Barr draw on the techniques developed by conversation ana-
lysts, they are interested in more than the accomplishment of con-
versational interchange. Rather, they study entire accounts in order
to learn how language use shapes and constructs social reality.' 40
One can draw a number of parallels between the methodology
used by Conley and O'Barr and my analysis of the Attitude Problem
case which appears below.' 4 ' In reviewing the records of what was
said during the case, I attempt to emulate their open-minded, induc-
tive approach by attending to what seems significant to the speakers.
I have incorporated into my analysis many of the comments received
when presenting excerpts of the case to a wide variety of audi-
ences, 142 thus approximating the two-hour group session used by
Conley and O'Barr. By making verbatim texts of the discourse in
this case available to you, the reader, to interpret using your own
competence as a speaker and member of society, I hope to create a
similar check against my own idiosyncracies. 143
In my analysis I also have worked toward creating a Geertzian
thick description, focusing on key words and offering possible expli-
cations of their broader and more complex meanings as construc-
tions of social reality. In doing so I found guidance in two other
ethnographic descriptions of legal discourse. In the first study, the
German sociologist Beatrice Caesar-Wolf described the way a judge
transformed lay testimony into "adjudicable evidence" in a West
German civil hearing. 144 Her goal was to explicate how the judge,
through the way he questioned the two witnesses, transformed their
fragmented testimony into "a thematically coherent, sequentially
presented story."' 45 Caesar-Wolf subjected the transcript of the
140 Id. at xi; O'Barr & Conley, supra note 131, at 109.
141 See infra text accompanying notes 162-80.
142 These audiences included my students, colleagues, and participants in the vari-
ous conferences listed supra note 1. These audiences typically reviewed at least the
judge's bench opinion and Johnson's initial interview description of the stop and arrest;
they watched the actual interview videotape and a re-enactment of the bench opinion
while following the text displayed by an overhead projector. Many also read the other
texts which appear in this Article. Most, however, did not repeatedly review these texts
before commenting, unlike the group participants in the Conley and O'Barr research
project.
143 I also hope that readers' independent interpretations of these facts will provide a
check against my bias as a participant in the events, a bias not present in the Conley and
O'Barr research.
144 Caesar-Wolf, supra note 126.
145 See id. at 195.
K
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hearing to "extensive and exhaustive content analysis with regard to
the.., largely latent meaning structures, which may not necessarily
be intended subjectively by the parties involved." 146 In addition to
micro-analysis of this text itself, she reconstructed its context by re-
viewing the legal processing of the case prior to the hearing, includ-
ing all available documents, a procedure similar to my account of
the history of the Attitude Problem Case. 147 In her view, this
method
both generates and tests theoretical propositions about legal real-
ity construction in court hearings. It is predicated on the assump-
tion that social interactions, even strictly individuated ones, are
not determined purely idiosyncratically, but at the same time ex-
press general structures. These structures are manifested in the
objective meaning contents generated in the course of the com-
munication process; as such, they may be reconstructed only
hermeneutically.148
The second study, by Michael Agar of testimony by truckers
before the Interstate Commerce Commission, described an ethno-
graphically-influenced method of discourse interpretation he
termed "thematic analysis":
Thematic analysis begins with a careful reading of a text to get a
sense of recurrent topics which indicate high-level content areas
significant for the speaker(s). The analyst selects one of the top-
ics, goes through the text, and pulls out all topic-relevant
passages. These passages are then used, together with whatever
else the analyst knows, to develop knowledge that enables an out-
sider to comprehend them. Some parts of the knowledge so de-
veloped will be recurrently useful in understanding; these parts
are the "themes."' 149
These recurrent, significant topics seem akin to what I term key
words; their "high level content . . . signals differences between
worlds."'-50 For Agar such textual analysis
serves as an occasion for the organization of the wide-ranging
knowledge that comes from participant observation and theoreti-
cal interest. Constructing and interpreting the themes allows one
• . . to pull together scattered knowledge from readings, inter-
views, and participant observation in a way that was both moti-
vated and constrained by the text at hand.' 5 '
146 Id. at 196.
147 Id.
148 Id.
149 Agar, supra note 126, at 113.
150 Id. at 117. Compare "meaning structures" in Caesar-Wolf, supra note 126.
151 Agar, supra note 126, at 124.
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One problem I face with applying any of the above studies is
that in none of the cases studied was an attorney significantly in-
volved: Conley and O'Barr studied pro se litigants in small claims
courts, in the West German civil hearing all the questioning was
conducted by the judge, 152 and in Agar's study the truckers appar-
ently spoke for themselves without assistance of counsel. This ab-
sence of attorney discourse is actually typical of much of the
research done to date, which uses data from small claims courts or
informal mediation proceedings.' 5 3 Even more rare are empirical
studies of how attorneys talk with their clients in private; no doubt a
major reason is the problem of attorney-client privilege. 154
A notable exception is the research project undertaken by for-
mer American Bar Foundation Executive Director William Felstiner
and political scientist Austin Sarat to record and study 115 lawyer-
client conversations in forty divorce cases. 155 Their analysis docu-
ments a consistent failure by the divorce attorneys to translate-or
even respond to-their clients' understanding of the significance of
the events that brought them to a lawyer's office:
152 In a West German civil hearing the judge examines all of the witnesses; counsel
may only ask questions with the court's permission. The judge is largely unrestricted in
the type or form of question that can be asked. Caesar-Wolf, supra note 126, at 194-95.
At the conclusion of a witness's testimony, the judge dictates into the record a summa-
tion of what he understands the testimony to be, using the first person as if he were the
witness; the witness must then explicitly confirm the judge's account. Id. at 195, 212-13.
The German judicial hearing thus has surprising structural similarities with an American
attorney's interview of a client-the judge takes the role of the attorney-which makes
Caesar-Wolf's study more relevant for my purposes than might first appear.
153 See, e.g., CONLEY & O'BARR, supra note 10; MERRY, supra note 113; O'Barr & Con-
ley, supra note 131; Pomerantz & Atkinson, supra note 11; Barbara Yngvesson, Making
Law at the Doorwa'v: The Clerk, the Court, and the Construction of Community in a New England
Town, 22 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 410 (1988).
154 See Felstiner et al., supra note 5, at 646 ("One of the reasons that data about
lawyers and dispute transformation are so incomplete and theoretical is the paucity of
observational studies of lawyer-client relationships."); see also Dinerstein, supra note 3, at
577 n.342 (1990). Other, more limited empirical studies of private attorney-client dis-
course include Bryna Bogoch & Brenda Danet, Challenge and Control in Lawyer-Client Inter-
action: A Case Study in an Israeli Legal Aid Office, 4 TEXT 249 (1984), and Carl J. Hosticka,
We Don't Care H'hat Happened, We Only Care About What Is Going to Happen: Lawyer Client
.Vegotiations of Reality, 26 Soc. PROBs. 599 (1979).
155 The project is initially described in Austin Sarat & William L.F. Felstiner, Lau'
and Strategy in the Divorce Lawyer's Office, 20 LAw & Soc. REV. 93 (1986). Various analyses
of the data set, which Sarat and Felstiner collected over thirty-three months in two sites
from different states, are reported in: Vocabularies of Motive, supra note 9; Austin Sarat &
William L.F. Felstiner, Lawyers and Legal Consciousness, 98 YALE LJ. 1663 (1989); Austin
Sarat & William L.F. Felstiner, Legal Realism in Lawyer-Client Communication, in LANGUAGE
IN THE JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 131; Austin Sarat, Lawyers and Clients: Putting Profes-
sional Service on the Agenda of Legal Education, 41 J. LEGAL EDUC. 43 (1991); and their con-
tribution to this symposium, Felstiner & Sarat, supra note 7. Sarat and Felstiner do not
report using the group session technique employed by O'Barr and Conley; presumably
their analyses are largely the product of their own collaborative review of the texts.
1992]
Clients focus their interpretive energy in efforts to construct an
explanation of the past and of their marriage's failure. Lawyers
avoid responding to these interpretations because they do not
consider that who did what to whom in the marriage is relevant to
the legal task of dissolving it. In this domain clients largely talk
past their lawyers, and interpretive activity proceeds without the
generation and ratification of a shared understanding of
reality.156
Absent even from Felstiner and Sarat's work though is the
equivalent of the input provided by the "native informant" in tradi-
tional ethnography. t57 The ethnographer of the exotic guesses at
the meaning of events which seem initially opaque because of their
strangeness; this opacity at least makes visible the "experience near
concepts" which are transparent to the natives who live with and by
them. But the ethnographer typically then tests his guesses by in-
terchange with the natives themselves, who may then be able to con-
firm the implicit meanings the ethnographer's necessarily arduous
and therefore intense analysis has made explicit.158
The ethnographies of legal discourse discussed above seem to
rely almost exclusively on the researcher's own introspective in-
sights on the meaning that a recorded event has for the participants.
Perhaps to the extent that the researcher is also a lawyer, the re-
searcher may assume that her competence to interpret the meaning
of the discourse is co-extensive with the lawyers who participate in
the studied events.' 59 From my perspective, though, the absence
156 Sarat & Felstiner, Vocabularies of Motive, supra note 9, at 742.
157 In their article in this symposium issue, Felstiner and Sarat do report on inter-
views with both client and attorney about their understandings of what was happening in
the relationship. Felstiner & Sarat, supra note 7, at 1475-81, 1491-95. It does not ap-
pear, however, that they discussed their own analyses with either participant. Cf notes
154 and 155, supra.
158 Geertz, for example, claims the Balinese have confirmed his interpretation of
cockfighting as a complex dramatization of status relationships. GEERTZ, supra note 86,
at 440. Indeed he derives from his conversation with the Balinese the metaphoric de-
scription of cockfighting as "playing with fire." Id. Geertz has been criticized, though,
for imposing his own understandings from a privileged position in the guise of present-
ing the "native point of view" in the Balinese cockfight essay. See Vincent Crapanzano,
Hermes' Dilemma: The Masking of Subversion in Ethnographic Description, in WRrrING CULTURE
74 (James Clifford & George Marcus eds., 1986), discussed in Christine B. Harrington &
Barbara Yngvesson, Interpretive Sociolegal Research, 15 Lw & Soc. INQUIRY 135, 145
(1990). Because "the authority of the anthropologist to portray the world of others is
contingent on dialogue and engagement," id. at 145, ethnographers continue to strive
for collaborative relations with the people studied. A striking example is a recent ethno-
graphic film about Australian aboriginal life that was produced through a group deci-
sionmaking process involving both Western ethnographers and native Australians. The
film, entitled Two Laws, is discussed id. at 148.
159 By turning the ethnographic gaze onto the apparently mundane activities of the
researcher's own culture, the ethnomethodological researcher becomes her own inform-
ant, assuming she has exactly the same competence to make sense of a studied event as
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from existing studies of the reflective lay person-client or pro se
litigant-as "informant" is even more serious. Conley and O'Barr
are typical in asserting that whether their interpretations of re-
corded discourse are idiosyncratic can be tested against the reader's
own assessment of the same texts. But the researcher and her audi-
ence are likely to be a rather small, homogenous group of privi-
leged, academically trained persons, probably members of the same
intellectual discipline. Thus the gap that these studies consistently
reveal between client and lawyer, party and judge-a gap related at
least in part to differences in ethnicity, class and education-could
well be replicated between researcher and studied participant.160
Lost is what seemed to be the major contribution of ethnography in
the first place: the sense of encountering a mind distinctly different
from your own and of thereby expanding your own imagination of
how life can be lived and understood.
One could provide a partial answer by structuring research so
that the interpretations produced by micro-analysis of texts are then
the participants themselves. However, it is likely that few of those researchers into legal
discourse who are legally trained have practiced extensively in the settings studied; typi-
cally the cases represent areas of practice where the bar is quite specialized: misde-
meanor defense, divorces, legal aid work. As Maynard persuasively showed in his study
of misdemeanor plea bargaining, such practice settings have their own distinctive forms
of discourse that have little to do with what most lawyers learned in law school. MAY-
NARD, supra note 115.
Admittedly, if as in this Article the person analyzing recorded discourse is also one
of the lawyers participating in the case, there is a risk of self-aggrandizing or self-flagel-
lating bias. My suggestion that a lawyer use ethnographic techniques on her own case is
directed more toward improving the lawyer's representation of that particular client and
toward expanding the lawyer's imaginative capabilities (for a similar use of ethnography
as a model for lawyering, see Lopez, supra note 8, at 1656, 1677). I am not ready to
assert that such very participatory observation has empirical value for researchers.
A very recent experiment in using graduate anthropology students to conduct
ethographic analyses of actual client interviews by clinical law students at the D.C.
School of Law suggests that such collaboration is capable of both improving the quality
of legal representation and providing useful social science data. See Lynne Robins, et al.,
"Using Ethnography in a Public Entitlements Clinic" (Paper presented to 1992 Annual
Meeting of Law & Society Association; on file with author). In particular, Robins, et al.,
suggest that the law students' experience of studying their recorded interviews in collab-
oration with the anthropologists gave a far more fundamental understanding of why
they needed to alter their modes of client interaction than could be achieved solely by
teaching techniques for interviewing. Id. at 2; see supra note 3.
160 Conley and O'Barr provide incisive criticism of both traditional and critical legal
studies for failing to systematically listen to and present the voices of those actually us-
ing and affected by the legal system. CONLEY & O'BARR, supra note 10, at 170. I agree
that they provide a significant service by presenting substantial verbatim texts of the
participants' actual speech rather than simply characterizing their discourse. Neverthe-
less, only the voice of the scholar is heard when that discourse is given significance
through interpretation. The same criticism could have been made of this Article but for
Johnson's initiative in contacting me last year that made possible the inclusion of his
voice in the analysis of his case.
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discussed with the lay participants themselves.16 1 In earlier versions
of this Article I spoke with deep regret about my inability to engage
in such a dialogue with Dujon Johnson about my interpretations of
what had happened during our representation of him because he
was no longer my client. But last year I was delighted and surprised
to receive a letter from Johnson, now living and going to school in
Iowa, inquiring whether I had ever written that article about his
case. I responded by sending him the current draft with a number
of pointed questions. What followed was a long telephone conver-
sation, a three page letter from Johnson, and a very pleasant meet-
ing in Iowa City last fall (where I happened to be for a conference)
during which I finally met his family and, I think, made the transi-
tion from attorney and researcher to friend. This fortuitous experi-
ence convinces me that involving the client in the interpretive
process has great value, at least if the client is willing and doing so
does not interfere otherwise with effective representation.
With his consent, I am incorporating many of Johnson's com-
ments on my analysis into this paper as the last section. As you will
see, his response surprised me on a number of points. I am deliber-
ately giving Dujon Johnson the last word on the meaning the Atti-
tude Problem Case.
IV
INTERPRETING THE TEXTS OF THE ATTITUDE PROBLEM CASE
A. The Police Report
I begin my analysis by attempting to make explicit my own un-
derstandings, as a participant in the case, of the significance of the
161 For example, Conley and O'Barr report post-trial interviews with parties but do
not indicate whether their own group analyses (which perhaps had not yet taken place)
were incorporated into those interviews. Id. at xi. Indeed, the parties' own retrospective
interpretations of the litigation events are not generally reported beyond their general
dissatisfaction with process and result, although Conley and O'Barr state that the post-
trial interviews "yielded telling insights and some of the most important clues to the
interpretation of earlier phases of disputes." Id.
Austin Sarat, in a recent ethnographic description of how nineteen welfare recipi-
ents discussed their experience in being represented by legal aid attorneys in welfare
disputes, seems to have engaged in such discussions with at least one of his informants
whom he identifies as "Spencer." Sarat takes his provocative title, The Law is All Over,
directly from Spencer's own words and builds much of his analysis around this and other
metaphoric key words and phrases used by Spencer and other informants to describe
the meaning of their experience. Austin Sarat, "... The Law is All Over". Power, Resistance
and the Legal Consciousness of the Welfare Poor, 2 YALEJ.L. & HUMANTmIs 343 (1990). Fur-
ther, Sarat reports a continuing dynamic engagement with Spencer during the entire
two-month research period about Spencer's contention that Sarat "couldn't really un-
derstand" Spencer's experience, which at least suggests that he shared his provisional
interpretations with Spencer. Id. at 350-51, 379; see also id. at 369 n.63 (Sarat question-
ing his own ability to comprehend his subjects' immediate material needs).
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police report. When I read the police report for the first time, some-
thing like the following sentences formed in my mind: "Our client
wasn't really arrested for disturbing the peace. This is a case of a
traffic stop that escalated into an abortive Terry stop-and-frisk which
was then converted into a pretext arrest." The second sentence can
only be fully understood if one knows the meaning of the three key
phrases in the language of the Fourth Amendment: traffic stop,
Terry stop-and-frisk, and pretext arrest. The use of these phrases
brought into play a complex way of conceptualizing the relationship
between American citizens and the police, a conceptual system built
on the single sentence of 54 words that constitutes the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution.162
The Fourth Amendment protects the right of the people to be
secure against "unreasonable searches and seizures" and specifically
prohibits issuance of warrants for searches and seizures unless the
warrant is based on probable cause, supported by sworn statement,
and specifies the place to be searched and the person or things to be
seized. The paradigmatic examples of permissible Fourth Amend-
ment activity are the seizure of a criminal suspect pursuant to an
arrest warrant and the search of a house for evidence of a crime,
pursuant to a warrant specifically identifying the location of the
house and the items of evidence to be seized. 163 However, the core
activities of arrest and house search pursuant to warrant now repre-
sent only a small part of the Fourth Amendment world. Primarily
through a process of expanding and complicating the meanings of
"reasonable," "search" and "seizure," a Fourth Amendment lan-
guage has developed which can now be used to describe and regu-
late an enormously wide variety of interactions between citizens and
the police.' 64
The Supreme Court's 1968 decision in Terry v. Ohio initiated
one of the most important expansions of Fourth Amendment lan-
guage.' 65 A policeman had approached Terry on the street, asked
him his name, and then patted Terry's breast pocket, feeling a pistol
162 The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. Const. amend. IV.
163 Implicit within the Fourth Amendment meaning of "warrant" is a process of
presenting the probable cause evidence to an independent magistrate; the search or
seizure can only take place if the magistrate decides to issue the warrant and then the
activity must take place within the limits set forth in the warrant.
164 In Cunningham, supra note 109, I discuss extensively the semantic history and
currently confused meanings of "searches" in the language of Fourth Amendment law.
165 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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within. At that time, those actions did not readily translate into
Fourth Amendment terms. The Court chose to expand the lan-
guage of the Fourth Amendment to cover what happened to Terry
by adding to Fourth Amendment vocabulary two words from police
vernacular: stop and frisk. The brief interrogation of Terry on the
street (the stop) although not an arrest was still a kind of seizure of
his person. The pat of his pocket (the frisk) was a kind of search,
albeit far less intrusive than the paradigm search of a house
Terry was not, however, a case of simplistic translation of "stop"
(police vernacular) into "seizure" (Fourth Amendment), or of
"frisk" into "search." Stop, frisk, search, and seizure all changed in
meaning as a result of the way they were used in the Terry opinion.
Indeed, the creation of new meaning in Terry is routinely recognized
through reference to this new category of search and seizure as the
"Terry stop-and-frisk." Before Terry, the stop and frisk were entirely
discretionary police procedures. Terry transformed the stop and
frisk into exercises of Fourth Amendment power and thus subjected
them to the Fourth Amendment principles of justification and re-
straint. But because the stop and frisk clearly could not fit within
the warrant process, the meaning of "reasonable searches and
seizures" in the Fourth Amendment suddenly became much more
complex. The Court held that if a seizure of a person is only a Terry
stop, it is reasonable as long as the officer has observed "unusual
conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude ... that criminal
activity may be afoot."1 66 If the search of a person is only a Terry
frisk, then it is reasonable so long as the officer can reasonably con-
clude "that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and
presently dangerous."' 167 Gone from the meaning of "reasonable
search and seizure" in this context is the requirement that the police
suspicion of criminal activity be based on the far more demanding
standard of probable cause or that an independent magistrate first
evaluate the suspicion based on sworn statement before the search
or seizure can take place. However, the officer must be able to artic-
ulate specific observations to support a stop and frisk-an "unpar-
ticularized suspicion or 'hunch' " will not suffice.' 68
The expansion of Fourth Amendment language to encompass
the Terry stop and frisk also led to the specialized meanings I under-
stood when I used the phrases "traffic stop" and "pretext arrest."
Stopping a motorist to issue a traffic ticket clearly is not an arrest,
but after Terry "stop" now suggested Fourth Amendment activity.
The Court has indeed extended Terry to traffic stops, holding in Del-
166 Id. at 30.
167 Id.
168 Id. at 27.
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aware v. Prouse 1 69 that a traffic stop must be based on "at least ar-
ticulable and reasonable suspicion" that the motorist has violated
the law.170 Could a traffic stop then lead to a Terry frisk? Again the
answer is yes: an officer engaged in a traffic stop can go so far as to
order a motorist out of the car and then frisk him.171 However, as in
Terry, the frisk must be justified by two separate articulable suspi-
cions: (1) that the suspect is engaged in a crime (the traffic violation)
necessitating the investigative stop, and (2) that the stopped suspect
is armed and presently dangerous.
The phrase "pretext arrest" also has special meaning in the
post-Terry legal world. Although Terry declined to apply strict prob-
able cause and warrant protections to the frisk, it retained the un-
derlying principles of justification (by requiring articulable
suspicion that a frisk was necessary to protect the officer from armed
assault during the encounter) and of restraint (by limiting the frisk
to searching activities likely to eliminate that risk). However, five
years after the Terry decision, the Supreme Court abandoned even
these principles in the context of frisks taking place after an arrest.
In United States v. Robinson,' 72 the Court held that incident to a lawful
arrest, an officer could conduct a complete search of the suspect
even if he had no basis for believing that the suspect was armed or
carrying evidence of a crime. Because earlier decisions had already
sanctioned warrantless arrests if the officer had probable cause and
needed to act swiftly to prevent escape or further crime, Robinson
created the obvious danger that an officer who wanted to frisk some-
one, but lacked the articulable suspicion required by Terry, would
arrest the person on a pretext and then conduct the frisk with
impunity. 173
By changing the meanings of "searches and seizures" in the
Fourth Amendment, the Court not only created new ways of talking
about police-citizen interactions; it changed those interactions in
profound and widely-varying ways. Although Terry may have been
intended to protect citizens from unjustified or excessive police tac-
tics, it also created new incentives to abuse the traffic stop and war-
rantless arrest. A patrolling officer wanting to interrogate and frisk
a suspect might be tempted to find a pretext to issue a traffic
ticket. 174 Having then stopped the suspect but lacking articulable
suspicion that the suspect was armed and dangerous, the officer
169 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
170 Id. at 663.
171 Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977).
172 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
173 See 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 10.8(a), at 59-63 (2d ed. 1986).
174 Fear of such potential abuse of the traffic stop led the Court in Delaware v. Prouse
to bar the practice of stopping motorists without evidence of a traffic violation. Prouse,
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might then make an arrest for a petty crime and frisk incident to the
arrest. Police discretion over traffic violations and misdemeanors is
broad in practice and abuse is likely to go unnoticed, particularly if
the frisk reveals no evidence of serious crime. If the frisk turns up
an unregistered handgun or illegal drugs, then, in a felony prosecu-
tion based on the discovered evidence, the prosecutor may have to
litigate the legality of the stop or arrest in a suppression hearing. 175
But if the frisk is unproductive, only the pretextual traffic ticket or
misdemeanor charge remains. Such cases rarely draw the attention
that could uncover abuse because they are litigated, if at all,176 in
the lowest courts which operate almost invisibly, in part because ap-
peals from such courts rarely result in published decisions. 77 Thus
it is the totally innocent person, who neither committed a traffic vio-
lation or petty crime nor carried evidence of a crime, who is least
likely to receive vindication for violated Fourth Amendment rights.
Because of these dangers, many commentators have recom-
mended that Terry stop and frisk activities be permitted only on ar-
ticulable suspicion of serious offense, excluding such petty crimes as
loitering and disorderly conduct.' 78 This recommendation, how-
ever, has not been acted upon, leaving the thankless task of vigi-
lantly defending petty prosecutions as one of the few potential
safeguards.
Application of Fourth Amendment language to the police re-
port operated in several different ways. When I read the phrase
"traffic stop," I assumed that the phrase had the same meaning in
the officer's vernacular as in my Fourth Amendment language. I did
not consciously translate; Ijust assumed the writer of the report and
I at that point were speaking the same language. However, several
440 U.S. at 663. Nevertheless, the Court left open the possibility of less-intrusive "spot
checks." Id.
The Court has sanctioned the use of roadblocks which stop all motorists to check
for sobriety in large part because the police have no discretion to stop particular motor-
ists on the pretext of checking for drunkenness but with a real agenda of looking in the
car or frisking the driver. Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 110 S. Ct. 2481 (1990).
175 Although the felony defendant may have the incentive and resources to chal-
lenge a police abuse of the Tery doctrine, such settings are inimical to correction of the
abuse. The defendant is often unsympathetic-many cases reach appellate courts on a
guilty plea conditioned on the right to appeal a lost suppression motion. And, of
course, it appears that the "abusive" practice has in fact ferreted out and perhaps pre-
vented criminal activity.
176 Many searches are undertaken without any intent to prosecute. LAFAVE, supra
note 173, § 9.4(0, at 537 & n.197.
177 For example, in Michigan, appeal from the district court is to the circuit court
which, unlike the intermediate state courts of appeal, does not issue published opinions.
See Mich. Ct. Rules 4.102(E) (appeals from misdemeanor trials in district court); 7.101
(appeals to circuit court); cf. Mich. Ct. Rule 7.215 (publication of opinions of the court of
appeals).
178 See LAFAVE, supra note 173, § 9.2(d).
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paragraphs later I deliberately translated the officer's request to
"pat him down only to dispel the possibility of him having any weap-
ons"' 179 as an attempted Terry frisk. Understood as a Terry frisk, the
officer's initial attempt at a pat down was "abortive" because the
officer's feeling "uneasy with the situation" did not translate into
Fourth Amendment articulable suspicion that our client was armed
and presently dangerous. The statements under the heading
"Cause for Arrest" added up to no more than a hunch that our cli-
ent might be armed and dangerous. The officer did not report ob-
serving anything specific, such as a bulge under clothing or a
sudden movement toward a pocket, that would indicate our client
had a weapon on his person or in reaching distance.
Still using Fourth Amendment language, I then substituted my
interpretation of what happened (a pretext arrest) for the officer's
statement, "arrested for Disorderly Person."' 80 When Johnson
(quite justifiably) refused to submit to a frisk, the officer converted
the Terry encounter into a pretext arrest in order to cover up the
impropriety of the frisk. When his hunch that Johnson possessed a
weapon or was hiding something such as contraband turned out
wrong, the officer was forced to carry through the charade that
Johnson had committed a misdemeanor.
By translating the police report into Fourth Amendment terms,
I sought to bring what happened into a universe of carefully regu-
lated relationships between citizens and police where the officer, not
our client, was the wrongdoer. At the same time I imposed on a
rather inchoate mass of shifting and fast moving events a structure,
sequence, and set of rules, rather like a chess game or courtly dance.
This translation appealed to my desire for a sense of moral out-
rage to fuel my advocacy and seemed to promise a winning strategy.
Of course it had nothing to do with our client's story-which I had
not yet heard-but at the time developing a theory of the case based
entirely on the police report seemed perfectly normal. Strategically,
we would win more easily if we could take the police version of what
happened as true rather than force the fact-finder to make a credi-
bility choice between the police account and our client's story. But
as a result, when I did hear the client's story by reviewing the video-
tape of the interview, I had already decided to translate the events
into Fourth Amendment terms.
179 POLICE REPORT, supra note 16, at 3.
180 Id.
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B. The Suppression Hearing
In retrospect, thinking of my advocacy as translation, I now see
the suppression motion as motivated in significant part by our de-
sire to shift the language in which the opposing lawyer and judge
discussed the case from that of substantive criminal law (the peace
disturbance) to the language of the Fourth Amendment. In the
translation of "what happened" into the language of the misde-
meanor complaint much was lost from Johnson's viewpoint. The
complaint failed to indicate that the only persons "disturbed" by
Johnson were police officers. Likewise, the only setting for what
happened in the complaint was "a place of business" (the gas sta-
tion). The context of police interrogation and searching was lost.
The complaint's language seemed to limit us to be arguing either
that our client did not speak and act as alleged or, if he did so, that
his conduct did not rise to the level of criminal peace disturbance.
We could hardly speak of the troopers as police at all. In contrast,
the suppression motion brought into play a language rich in vocabu-
lary about police conduct that we could use to talk persuasively
about our client as victim rather than wrongdoer.
However, like all vital languages, the language of the Fourth
Amendment had both limitations and potentialities beyond my com-
prehension at the time I chose to use it. I thought of that language,
if at all, as simply one of many tools I could take to hand in the
service of my client. It took a shocking defeat to make me realize
that what I thought was well in hand possessed a life of its own.
The shock of hearing the judge's blatant disavowal of what I
thought Teny stood for caused me to become aware of how meaning
was both lost and added by translating "what happened" in Fourth
Amendment terms. James Boyd White has suggested that the
Supreme Court's interpretations of the Fourth Amendment be read
as creating a language that citizens and police officers might actually
use in talking about their interactions.'" 1 One correlative of this
concept is that the citizen and the police officer each would demand
of Fourth Amendment language that it "speak to the situation in a
way that he can respect."' 182 This standard does not require the
Court to satisfy the expectations of both citizen and officer; in any
given interpretation one or the other might justifiably feel that his
181 James Boyd White, The Fourth Amendment as a Way of Talking About People, 1974
Sup. CT. REV. 165 [hereinafter White, Talking About People]. A revised and edited version
appears as Chapter 8 inJusTIcE As TRANSLATION. See WHIrrE, supra note 65, ch. 8. In the
original article, White refers to this concept as a "discourse of adjudication." White,
Talking About People, supra, at 166. In the revised version which appears in JusTICE AS
TRANSLATION he has changed his terminology to "language of adjudication." WHITE,
supra note 65, at 178.
182 White, Talking About People, supra note 181, at 166.
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rights and needs have not been given adequate weight. But none-
theless, as long as the Court's language provides a vocabulary in
which each participant can voice his concern, the Court successfully
creates a "comprehensible public world" that both can respect.' 83
The alternative is an interpretation creating a language that one of
the participants, either citizen or officer, "cannot speak, in which he
cannot locate himself, which does not deal in intelligible ways with
claims he regards as important."' 8 4
Terry can thus be read as providing a language that gives a voice
to both the citizen and the officer. The officer can speak of his inter-
est in protecting his safety and his corresponding need to make
quick, on-the-spot decisions; thus, in his view the court should re-
spect his judgment and discretion. In turn, the citizen can speak of
even a momentary interrogation against his will, or a brief intrusion
on his personal privacy, as a violation of his legal rights. Terry gives
the citizen a voice to ask the officer to justify his actions in terms of
the officer's mission to detect or prevent crime, and further empow-
ers the citizen to ask the officer to limit his intrusion to the minimum
necessary to serve that mission.
However, there is a potential danger in the language created by
Terry. What if the officer turns the language of Terry against the de-
cision by arguing to a court in the following way:
You are not speaking fairly to the hazards and uncertainties of my
task. When I stop a suspect, my decisions must be made quickly
and on the basis of incomplete information. You are asking me to
risk my life just because I might not be able to justify my actions
months later to ajudge by pointing to what you call "articulable"
facts. Yet I know and you know that my sense of danger may be
both real and accurate even if I cannot articulate it. 185
Before Terry, the officer, in her attempt to describe the search as
"reasonable," would have been largely limited to speaking of the
need to preserve evidence and the limited intrusion of the search.
The ensuing discussion would have therefore implicitly balanced
the citizen's Fourth Amendment rights only against the effective de-
tection and prosecution of crime. The citizen could speak of his
own real and specific harm caused by the search, but the officer
could invoke only speculative prevention of harm to a hypothetical
future crime victim if the search could not take place. But Terry
183 Id. at 167.
184 Id.
185 This passage is based on a similar imaginary argument in White's article. See Id.
at 199; WHrrE, supra note 65, at 193-94. For a well-reasoned argument that Terry and its
progeny strike the wrong balance of competing Fourth Amendment values, see Tracey
Maclin, The Decline of the Right of Locomotion: The Fourth Amendment on the Streets, 75 COR-
NELL L. REv. 1258 (1990).
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changed this by giving the officer an enormously powerful new rhe-
torical resource: the ability to match, and perhaps overwhelm, the
citizen's voice by also speaking in the first person of his own rights
and of the not very speculative potential harm to him while con-
ducting his perilous public service.
The Robinson decision 8 6 can be read then as fulfilling the dan-
gerous potential of the language created by Terry. Under the
Court's holding in Robinson the simple fact of arrest terminates the
citizen's right to speak in the language given to him by Terry: once
arrested, a citizen can no longer ask the officer tojustify a search of
his person, on grounds of either preserving evidence or protecting
the officer's safety. 187 The Robinson decision shows that, once the
citizen is thus silenced, the voice of the officer, speaking of the need
for a standardized practice of disarming and discovering evidence in
all arrests, carries the day.
Interpreted in this light, Trooper Mraz's testimony was charged
with a force I did not recognize at the time. His responses to our
insistent questioning about whether Johnson appeared armed and
dangerous no longer appear to be evasions designed to cover a
weak case. Instead, Mraz was saying that from his point of view it
did not matter whether there were visible signs that Johnson was a
potential threat to their safety because, in order to protect them-
selves and perform their duty, the troopers must treat every motor-
ist "as if they were armed and dangerous."' 88 He took every
opportunity to speak of their need for personal safety.' 89
When we wrote our suppression motion, we thought with satis-
faction that we were mounting our client on a vehicle that might
carry him to victory; instead, we had set in motion a juggernaut that
rolled right over him. I had failed to recognize that our Fourth
Amendment translation included the semantics of Robinson as well
as Terry. Beguiled by the superficial holding of Terry, I thought
Mraz's testimony was favorable to us and thus did not hear the force
186 414 U.S. 218 (1973); see text accompanying notes 172-73.
187 "A custodial arrest of a suspect based on probable cause is a reasonable intru-
sion under the Fourth Amendment; that intrusion being lawful, a search incident to the
arrest requires no additional justification. It is the fact of the arrest which establishes the
authority to search." Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235.
188 See supra p. 1315. Mraz essentially made this statement three times within two
pages of the hearing transcript. Toward the end of the student's examination, Mraz
emphasized the point again: "As I stated previous [sic], every time we make a traffic stop
we treat the person as if, doesn't mean that they were, as if they were carrying a weapon,
for our safety." Hearing, supra note 32, at 13.
189 See Hearing, supra note 32, at 11; supra p. 1316 ("The reason Trooper Kiser pat-
ted him down is that, for his safety along with mine.... Basically the pat down was done
for the officer's safety, the troopers' safety, myself and Trooper Kiser.") I do not know
whether Mraz's emphatic testimony on these points was spontaneous or part of a stan-
dard police "script" for testifying on Terry stop issues.
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of his consistent claim that their actions were taken to protect "the
troopers' safety."' 190 ButJudge Collins heard Mraz's voice loud and
clear, so clearly that he extended the logic of Robinson to explicitly
reject the holding of Terry itself. Acknowledging that in this particu-
lar case the troopers "didn't have any reason to believe that the per-
son was armed and presently dangerous," he nonetheless said that
Trooper Kiser acted reasonably in doing "a brief pat down to pro-
tect both himself and his partner" because Kiser's "first duty" was
to survive. It seemed that in the world created by the language of
Robinson, DujonJohnson had no right to ask for explanations orjus-
tifications; his role was to submit.'19 Even worse, his effort to speak
the Terry-language of the Fourth Amendment to the police was
properly punishable as the wrong "attitude." The police had the
first, last, and only word.
C. What the Client Said
1. A Respectable Person
When I reviewed the videotape of Johnson's interview before
the trial date, the judge's key phrase "attitude ticket" alerted me to a
correlative key word in Johnson's narrative: respect. He referred to
himself as a "respectable person" and made a careful distinction be-
tween respecting authority and not respecting the abuse of author-
ity.192 I thus interpreted his narrative as being about the troopers'
failure to give him the respect he deserved and his appropriate re-
fusal to accord them the respect they wrongfully demanded: a prob-
lem of attitudes.
Although our intent in shifting the case's language from sub-
stantive criminal law to that of the Fourth Amendment was to move
the focus from our client's alleged wrongdoing to that of the troop-
ers, the Fourth Amendment language did not enable us to talk
meaningfully about what Johnson perceived as their "attitude prob-
lem." The central question at the suppression hearing was whether
190 See id.
191 Ifa citizen asked how... Robinson defined his place in a public world, he
would find that he is given no right to insist that the officer explain or
justify what he does; his role is simply to submit.... Robinson ... stands
as a permanent rhetorical resource... [for] anyone who wishes to argue
that the police should have one blanket power or another as a matter
simply of "authority."..... [Ilt introduces into our constitutional law a
principle of moral and intellectual brutality ....
[Robinson] expose[s] to a substantial, arbitrary, and unreviewable
exercise of police power every person who violates a substantial traffic
rule, which is in practice virtually everyone... [and] defines the arrested
person as an object of unregulated power ....
Talking About People, supra note 181, at 203, 205.
192 See supra p. 1331.
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the troopers had particularized suspicion that Johnson was armed
and presently dangerous. Therefore, the probing spotlight we in-
tended to shine on the troopers promptly reflected back onto our
client. And that refracted light had a very narrow focus. The physi-
cal space illuminated was a short, narrow corridor extending from
Johnson's car at the gas pump to the point where he first stopped
when Kiser called out to him. The temporal space was even smaller:
the minute or so from the time Kiser called out to the moment of
arrest. Left obscured in darkness were the images of the police car
"whipping in" to block Johnson's car, the swaggering Kiser pulling
on his black gloves as he stepped towardJohnson, and Mraz peering
into Johnson's car with a flashlight.
And the loss was even greater. By translating the event as a
"Terry-stop," we narrowed the issue to whether Kiser justifiably felt
a threat to his safety, making only two aspects of "what happened"
relevant: how our client appeared to the trooper and how the
trooper felt about that apparent behavior. The Fourth Amendment
story we sought to tell could be imagined as a scene played out on a
tiny, briefly illuminated stage on which only one isolated actor ap-
peared (Johnson), who spoke and responded to an unseen person in
the wings (Kiser).193 How the troopers behaved, and how our client
felt about their behavior, were simply not part of the picture.
The impact of thejudge's "translation" of what happened, "at-
titude ticket," not only shocked me loose from the constraints of
viewing the events solely in Fourth Amendment terms but also sug-
gested a new way of hearing and communicating our client's story.
The word "attitude" inherently assumes an interactive relationship.
One can not have an attitude in total isolation. The underlying
question always is, "attitude in relation to what?" Judging John-
son's attitude therefore required inclusion of the troopers' behavior,
opening the door for us to argue that our client's attitude was en-
193 I have slipped into a dramatic metaphor. The proscenium arch that separates
the stage from the audience in a typical theater is literally a frame and even a "real-life"
play must be a kind of translation. No matter how the playwright, actors, and director
strive for accuracy, they can not help but exclude much of what happened in the re-
enacted events and add their own interpretations.
One could make the same point by imagining our Fourth Amendment framing in
terms of a television camera. By using the report as our experiential foundation, we had
used the trooper's perspective for our camera angle. We presented only what he saw
without shifting the angle to our client's perspective, putting the trooper "on screen,"
or moving the camera to a third party perspective which would have placed both client
and trooper in the camera's frame. Like the play, even the apparently verbatim nature of
videotaping is a translation, because any perspective and focus necessarily involves ex-
clusion, an exclusion that results in an interpretation of what happened. For example,
even if the camera is held from the vantage point of a disengaged third party, it cannot
then "see" exactly what either participant sees.
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tirely appropriate in response to what the troopers were doing and
saying.
2. Being Treated Diferently
The last meeting with our client on the day of trial had left me
with the gnawing doubt that much of his bitter frustration resulted
from our inability to understand enough of what he was saying to
translate well, that our "attitude problem" translation was incom-
plete. But it took months before I recognized the first of what were
to be many clues that my doubt was well-founded.
As I pondered this problem, the other comment Derrick Bell
made at the symposium came back to me.194 This comment was as
casually confident, in its own way, as the judge's "attitude ticket"
description. He was sure that the "problem" was a very familiar
one: our client got in trouble simply because he was viewed as "an
uppity nigger."
Bell's comment suggested that the lack of respect was part of a
story of racial oppression. Of course, such a story would extend far
beyond the narrow confines even of our lifetimes. But that story, at
a minimum, began several minutes earlier and several hundred
yards outside the frame that my "respect" translation imposed:
back at the intersection of Hewitt and Washtenaw Avenues.
When I had replayed the videotape of the client interview in
reaction to Judge Collins's bench opinion, I had deliberately fast-
forwarded to the point where Johnson described what happened af-
ter he got out of his car at the gas station. I only studied this three-
minute segment of the videotape (which is reprinted above),195 as I
prepared and presented the first draft of this article. Although I had
seen the entire tape shortly after it was made, I did not view the tape
from the beginning of the interview again until several months after
first presenting the draft article, when I prepared to use the tape for
a discussion of interviewing in my class on pre-trial practice. 196
I asked the students in watching the tape to apply the transla-
tion model by using one word or phrase to summarize from the cli-
ent's description "what happened" and then asking themselves what
was necessarily left out from the client's story when that word or
phrase was used. Regardless of the phrase used by the various stu-
dents (typically "illegal search"), almost all of them "left out" the
194 See supra text accompanying note 47 (discussing Bell's first comment on the Atti-
tude Problem Case made at the University of Michigan Law Review's Legal Sloiytelling
Symposium).
195 See supra pp. 1322-24.
196 I was willing to play a longer sequence because I had a captive audience for a
longer period and I wanted my students to see how the interview began and developed.
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following rather long narrative about Johnson's trouble with the
clutch in his car-a part of the videotape that I had literally omitted
up to then by my selective viewing and which of course I have left
out of the story I have told you so far:
Cl I was having problems with the clutch; I had run
down on hydraulic oil. And when I went shopping
previously and [inaudible] observed I needed some
gas, I went shopping for some oil because every time
I went to a stop light, you know, the clutch, I
couldn't shift it, so I had to turn it off, in order to
shift it.
St Wait. You had to turn the car off to...
Cl You see, I was having problems with my clutch.
St Right.
Cl The significance will, will develop as I [inaudible].
Well, I had problems with the clutch. I know at the
time it was short of hydraulic oil. I'm not a
mechanic. Uh, I went to Meijer's for the shopping
and went to the auto department and asked them,
well I've got this problem, what can I do?
St Was this, this right before ...
Cl Right before I realized I needed gas.
St Are they open 24 hours?
Cl Yes, they most certainly are.
Other St Oh yeh!
St I didn't know that - so that's good to know.
Cl I can't recall the cashier's name but I know his face
so if I went back, he probably... He explained to
me that I need, um, hydraulic oil. The problem with
the clutch was that it would stick. I couldn't shift. In
order to shift the gear, I would have to turn the
engine off - that way I wouldn't damage it. So after
telling me some hydraulic oil - I bought some,
purchased some. And I said... I got into the car
and [inaudible] the gas. I said, what I'll do, I'll put
this in when I pump my gas. So I proceeded to the
gas station on Hewitt and Washtenaw. And there
was a flashing red light. I turned the car off.
St Right.
Cl Because I couldn't slow down and shift. Turned the
car off. Put it in first. Crossed the street and then
went on. There wasn't any traffic coming.
St So, did you come to a complete stop?
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Cl Came to a complete stop. Lights stayed on and
everything, though.
The failure to pay attention to this part of the interview is particu-
larly striking because Johnson himself emphasized that the clutch
problem's significance "would develop" as he told the whole story.
When I pre-viewed the tape before class, I had mentally skipped
over the clutch story much as I had done earlier by fast-forwarding
the machine. However, as I watched the tape again with my stu-
dents in class, I suddenly "saw" for the first time why the clutch
problem was significant to Johnson and why generally the moments
before our client entered the station, which I had edited out, might in
fact be indispensable to a faithful translation of Johnson's story.
The problem with the clutch was important to Johnson because
it made him certain that he had come to a full stop at the intersec-
tion. Because the clutch was "acting up," he needed to stop and
turn off the engine in order to shift gears. Thus, when Trooper Ki-
ser approached him at the gas station, Johnson apparently felt sure
that the trooper could not have thought, even mistakenly, that he
had run the flashing red light. Given that certainty, what was the
most likely explanation in Johnson's mind for the stop?
Trooper Mraz testified that Johnson had said that night "the
only reason that we stopped him was because he was black."' 197 In-
deed, Mraz listed this statement as the first "reason" when asked
what our client had done to be a "disorderly person." Judge Collins
clearly thought our client was making this claim and rejected it, say-
ing "they didn't just see a black man in a gas station and say oh
there's a black man in the gas station, let's go and arrest him.., that
didn't happen."198 Yet at no point during the entire 50 minute ini-
tial interview, nor later during our representation, did Dujon John-
son tell us that he thought the trooper stopped him because he was
black or otherwise claim that their actions were motivated by racism.
Indeed, he did not even volunteer the information that the troopers
were white; the students asked that question on their own initiative.
I believe that Judge Collins introduced the actual word "racism"
first into the language of the case when he described our client as
"hollering racism" in his exchange with the troopers. 199 I find it
telling that the two-page statement of facts written by the students
after the initial interview not only did not mention a possible issue
of racism, but also did not even indicate that our client was black.
As best as I can recall, I had from the outset a common-sense
impression that what happened that night was a "racial incident,"
197 See Hearing, supra note 32, at 15; supra p. 1317.
198 See Hearing, supra note 32, at 27; supra p. 1320.
199 See Hearing, supra note 32, at 27; supra p. 1320.
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but as a lawyer I did not talk about "the case" that way, and therefore
I ceased to think in terms of racial issues as our various translations
shaped and limited our shifting understanding of what was legally
relevant. The Fourth Amendment theory seemed race neutral, and
even our "attitude problem" trial strategy did not (at least explic-
itly) present Johnson's demand for answers in racial terms.200
But my long-overdue recognition ofJohnson's emphasis on why
he was stopped in the first place forced me to face the possibility
that we needed to include in our representation ofJohnson a legal
translation of the statement, "I was stopped because I was black."
Once I began trying such a translation, I also started noticing other
elements that I had previously excluded from the descriptions of
events given by the troopers, prosecutor, and judge. Indeed, as I
re-read the incident report in this new light, I found myself thinking
that I might have mistranslated the police report as much as our
client's narrative.
My initial reaction to reading the report had been that, despite
its title, it was not a story about arresting a "disorderly person," but
rather the account of a Terry-stop that went awry, turning into a pre-
text arrest. This translation not only caused me to ignore much of
my client's narrative; it also excluded the first page and a half of the
report itself by beginning the story afterJohnson exited his car. Be-
cause the new translation focused on why Johnson was stopped in
the first place, rather than simply on what happened after the stop, I
needed to examine the reasons given in the report for the stop.
Once I shifted my attention, I noticed immediately that the re-
port itself began by identifying the "primary incident" as occurring
at the intersection; the events at the gas station were described as
"secondary." Given this clue, I soon realized that the language of
the entire report was that of routine traffic regulation, not crime de-
tection and enforcement. 20 1 Johnson was referred to, not as "sus-
pect," but as "Driver." The description of events at the gas station
was prefaced with the phrase, "a subsequent traffic stop ensued." 20 2
The critical paragraph, "Cause for Arrest," began with the words,
''upon continuing the normal course of action on this traffic
stop." 2 03
200 See supra at pp. 1326-27.
201 See POLICE REPORT, supra note 16. In analyzing narrative structure in plea bar-
gaining, Maynard emphasizes the importance of "the police report as a socially con-
structed "documentary reality" . . . one that aims for particular readings in contexts
other than that in which it was written." Douglas W. Maynard, Narratives and Narrative
Structure in Plea Bargaining, in LANGUAGE IN THE JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 131, at 65,
80.
202 POLICE REPORT, supra note 16, at 1.
203 Id. at 2.
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Because we thought we had a strong argument that Trooper
Kiser had exceeded the proper scope of a traffic stop when he
sought to conduct a pat-down search, we never contested the pow-
erful and pervasive claim implicit in the report that what happened
was "incident to" a routine traffic stop. But as I reread the report, I
suddenly recalled other words Johnson said at our post-dismissal
meeting: "I'm not trying to put my story against their story.
They're trying to paint a picture and I'm trying to destroy it." What
was the "picture" Johnson was trying to destroy? Probably not the
pretext that grounds for a Terry frisk existed; that was more like put-
ting our story against their story, and accepting the basic premise, as
did the judge, that the police had legitimate reasons to be interro-
gating Johnson in the first place. Perhaps Johnson wanted to de-
stroy that basic premise.
Because I did not realize the force of the language describing
what happened as a "routine traffic stop," I also failed to appreciate
the significance of the word "ticket" when I seized upon Judge Col-
lins's phrase "attitude ticket." Instead, I just focused on the word
"attitude." But the "ticket" aspect of his translation set us up for
the devastating day of trial by trivializing what happened. What we
viewed as criminal prosecution, and what Johnson viewed as a seri-
ous assault on his dignity, the troopers, the prosecutor, and the
judge viewed as a ticket.
What were the implications of translating what happened as a
ticket? First, it continued the primacy of the "routine traffic stop,"
making the interrogation, search and arrest "incident" to a traffic
ticket. Second, it radically decreased the importance of what was at
stake. Citizens are not expected to seriously contest tickets. They
either pay them or ignore them. Because this was just a ticket, our
efforts to convert the criminal procedure into a re-enactment of the
event, a courtroom drama that would ritually restore Johnson's dig-
nity, were not taken seriously.20 4 The prosector had an irrefutable
response: this is not worth my time. The final, authoritative de-
scription of "what happened" was spoken in chorus by the prosecu-
tor and judge: "this is a $50 attitude ticket." The initial affront to
our client's sense of respect was thus repeated in the guise of resolv-
ing the case in his favor.
As these implications of accepting the "routine traffic stop"
characterization sank in, I began looking harder for ways to accom-
plish Johnson's goal of destroying the whole picture. As a result, I
204 Maynard's study of plea bargaining in a California misdemeanor court has led
him to conclude that such judicial processes are essentially bureaucratic, that defendants
are treated "as objects in [an] assembly-line," and that the courtroom ritual is structured
so as to be "status degrading for defendants." MAYNARD, supra note 115, at 30, 48.
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noticed a number of other details that were excluded from our prior
translations:
The car: Johnson was driving a 1977 Triumph two-door con-
vertible, no doubt a very sporty-looking car despite its age.
The time: The events took place at 4:30 a.m., a time when
police might be particularly suspicious of criminal activity.205
The clothes: Johnson was still wearing his jogging clothes.
The location: the intersection was located near the county
country club in a fairly affluent white suburban area between Ypsi-
lanti and Ann Arbor, at some distance from the "poor black" part
of Ypsilanti.
The disposition of the traffic ticket: the ticket for running the
flashing light was dismissed when neither trooper showed up for
the scheduled court date.
I also recalled another fact we had largely ignored: Johnson's
insistence, contrary to the report, that the troopers had not told him
that he had run a red light when they stopped him.20 6
These details, combined with Johnson's certainty that he had
made a full stop, suggested that the troopers were engaged in what
might be euphemistically called "good police work." 207 They saw
someone who fit their own profile of a drug dealer or burglar and
decided to investigate to see what might "turn up." The fact that
the person was black might have been an important reason why the
profile "fit," both because he was "out of place" in a white part of
town in the middle of the night, and because of stereotypes about
the criminal propensities of blacks, especially young black men.20 8
205 Johnson told us he was out so late because he had worked an evening shift, went
running after work, stopped at a relative's house in Ypsilanti to shower and change, and
then did some shopping at a 24-hour grocery store before beginning to head home for
Detroit.
206 Supra, text following note 27.
207 One survey of police officers revealed that 80% believed the need to deter crime
by an aggressive police presence justified rigorous stop-and-question tactics, even if
those tactics exceeded the letter of the law. Dan Stormer & Paul Bernstein, The Impact of
Kolender v. Lawson on Law Enforcement and Minority Groups, 12 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
105, 115 n.56 (1984).
208 "Studies show... that police officers perceive blacks as more likely to engage in
criminal activity or to be armed and dangerous. When minorities are found outside
minority neighborhoods, race may become the principal basis for an officer's suspicion."
Id. at 116 (citations omitted).
Spend an evening on patrol with Mobile Reserve officers Dick Bur-
gess, John Frank or John Winter and watch them stop one car after an-
other. They are especially interested in cars with two or more young
black males, or in rental cars with out-of-state plates, which they say can
be a telltale sign of a drug car. It is all constitutional, according to the
police lawyers. 'Reasonable suspicion,' they say.
John M. McGuire, Reasonable Suspicion: The Law 's on Their Side, ST. Louis POsT-DISPATCH,
July 9, 1991, at ID, 4D.
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From this perspective, the fact that this person objected to a search
of his car and person only confirmed their hunch, or in the words of
Trooper Mraz, "[brought] up [their] intensity level a little bit
higher." 20 9 Thus the motive for a pretext arrest changed from the
grounds expressed by the judge at the suppression hearing"-an
anxiety over personal safety-to a deliberate plan to search for evi-
dence of some unknown crime based largely on the race of the
suspect.
My new focus on why the troopers stopped Johnson revealed
another detail in the police report that we had ignored before. On
the first page of his report, Trooper Kiser stated that, as they "pur-
sued" the car after it went through the intersection, he "observed
driver of vehicle to look over at patrol unit .... Vehicle then made
an abrupt left turn into the TOTAL gas station."2 10 This detail ac-
quired significance for three different translations of what hap-
pened. From the perspective of the police report, Trooper Kiser's
observation apparently suggested to him that the driver was at-
tempting to evade pursuit, thus providing the first articulated basis
for suspecting the driver of criminal activity. According to Johnson,
he planned to stop for gas before he reached the intersection and,
far from pulling in to evade pursuit, was not even aware of the
troopers until he got out of his car. Combining these facts with
what I was now assuming to be Johnson's belief that there was no
nonracial reason for stopping him, Kiser's "observation" did not
translate into reasonable suspicion, but rather into either hypersen-
sitivity because the driver was black or an after-the-fact lie made up
to justify his actions at the station. However, this detail in the report
took on greatest significance for the judge's translation of what hap-
pened. Although we had made no assertion in our brief that what
happened was racially motivated, the judge obviously assumed that
was Johnson's view. His confident rejection of that view was critical
to his conclusion that what happened was a justified attitude ticket.
His logic was: (a) the officers had justification to stop the vehicle,
(b) they "didn't just see a black man in a gas station and say... let's
go and arrest him," and (c) "once having stopped him, he was the
author of his own problems." 211 Of course for purposes of the sup-
pression motion we had conceded the first premise of Judge Col-
lins's argument. However, our focus on the gas station portion of
the report led us to miss an important admission in the report that
undermined the judge's second premise. The judge said:
209 See Hearing, supra note 32, at 11; supra text accompanying note 37.
210 POLICE REPORT, supra note 16, at 1.
211 See Hearing, supra note 32, at 27; supra text accompanying note 40.
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I'm sure that these two officers had no clue when they saw this
person run the red light, whether he was black or white or brown
or red or green or any other color. They just didn't know and so
the person was walking around with a chip on his shoulder and
these officers were the object of that behavior.212
Judge Collins obviously assumed that the troopers saw only a car
and not the driver within it, yet Trooper Kiser's acute observation
that the driver "looked over at patrol unit" certainly suggested, to
the contrary, that he got a good look at Johnson as the car passed
through the intersection.
By eliminating race from our translation of what happened, we
not only excluded a possible alternative explanation for the troop-
ers' actions, we also probably distorted Johnson's motivations. Our
story of what happened portrayed Johnson as a person with a law-
yer's concern for the technicalities of the law, asking the police to
justify their investigative actions in terms of the Fourth Amendment.
In telling this story we did not invent elements; our client really did
report to us that he referred to Supreme Court precedent in re-
sponding to the troopers' demand to submit to a pat-down
search.213 But by framing outJohnson's possible larger concern, we
may have presented a very distorted and ultimately rather unsympa-
thetic picture of our client.214 What the judge "saw" were two state
troopers just trying to do their jobs, whose patience was exhausted
by a guy who was "too smart for his own good." 2 15
212 Hearing, supra note 32, at 28; supra text accompanying note 40 (emphasis added).
213 See Initial Interview, supra text accompanying note 44.
214 But see Johnson's own explanation for why he did not raise the issue of racism,
infra note 248 and accompanying text.
215 During the fall of 1991, Gerald Early, a black professor at Washington Univer-
sity, was subjected to a Teny stop at a suburban St. Louis shopping mall because a shop-
keeper had called the police when he saw Early window shopping while waiting for his
wife to come out of a meeting. In an Op-Ed article entitled, "Living in Fear of Fear,"
Early responded to the view that the shopkeeper's fear was reasonable and that the po-
lice officer was "only doing his job":
This is what happens when one becomes a category instead of a person.
Life takes on all the depressing dimensions of something vaguely yet om-
inously totalitarian because, if one is at the caprice of fearful whites be-
cause of one's skin color, then one is always at the mercy of something
that one can neither defend against nor deny....
[When] I received calls and expressions of support from blacks ...
almost always they were accompanied by a story of some similar indignity
that they themselves had suffered and how they were unable to get it pub-
licized because they were not "distinguished university professors."
They were ordinary people (of course I am no less ordinary) for whom
my interrogation and demand for apology became all the interrogations
they had ever endured because some white thought them "suspicious" or
in the wrong place at the wrong time.
[T]here is a far more important principle at stake than concern for
the shopkeeper's security: In order to have a free society, a democratic
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In thinking about the way that our translations of Johnson's
story erased his racial identity, I am reminded of hearing Patricia
Williams, a black law professor, tell her experience of having her
race literally edited out of an article she had submitted to a law re-
view.216 The article as submitted began with a personal account of
being denied entrance to a New York City boutique when she
pressed her "brown face" to the window of the locked door.2 17 Her
rage when the clerk within looked at her and said, "We're closed"
(at one o'clock in the afternoon) became the springboard for the
rest of the article.218 The editors deleted the "brown" from her
"face," explaining that their editorial policy barred descriptions of
"physiognomy.- 2 1 9 She reported that, "Ultimately, I did convince
the editors that mention of my race was central to the whole sense of
the subsequent text; that my story became one of extreme paranoia
without the information that I am black."'220 It seems obvious that
the reader needed to know that Williams was black to appreciate her
rage and to understand its application to her article, but as she
pointed out, it was "the blind application of principles of neutrality,
through the device of omission [that acted] ... to make me look
crazy."
Had we, through a similar blind application of legal language,
acted to make our client look paranoid, crazy? How much blame did
we share for Judge Collins's judgment that our client was "acting
strange and unusual" and "was walking around with a chip on his
shoulder"? 221
Of course even ifJudge Collins believed that the troopers could
tell that Johnson was black when they first saw him at the intersec-
tion, he apparently still would have rejected a claim that their ac-
tions were racially motivated. In a very telling remark, the judge
stated: "the fact that one person is black and the other is caucasian
does not make it [a] racial incident." 222 At one level, of course the
society, everyone must be permitted equal and free access to public
spaces so long as he or she is engaged in publicly acceptable behavior.
To understand and accept democracy is to understand and accept the risk
implicit in this principle, for no one forfeits his or her right to unscru-
tinized and unquestioned public access or the presumption of innocence
in his or her actions upon mere nervous suspicion.
Gerald Early, Living in Fear of Fear, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, November 27, 1991, at 3C.
216 This story is told in PATRICIA WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS:
DIARY OF A LAW PROFESSOR ch. 3 (1991).
217 Id. at 44.
218 Id. at 45.
219 Id. at 47.
220 Id.
221 See Hearing, supra note 32, at 27, 28; supra text accompanying note 40.
222 See Hearing, supra note 32, at 27; supra text accompanying note 40. It is not
accidental that the judge used the singular when describing "the other" as caucasian
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difference in race makes the incident "racial." What Judge Collins
seemed to mean was that the fact that Trooper Kiser was white did
not automatically mean that his conduct toward a black was racist.
Further, Judge Collins implied that our client had wrongly assumed
that the conduct was racist simply because the trooper was white:
"the person was walking around with a chip on his shoulder and
these officers were the object of that behavior. ' 223 If there was any
racial aspect to the incident, the source of the tension was entirely
Johnson himself. "He was the author of his own problems," the
judge ruled. 224
Up to this point our failure to argue that our client was the vic-
tim of racism may have not appeared really a problem of translation.
Rather the cause seemed to have been due to our client's failure to
raise this claim to us directly and our distraction from evidence
pointing toward such a claim by our preoccupation with other legal
theories. The translation metaphor does, however, suggest why we
were so easily distracted. While one is speaking a language, its limi-
tations seem so natural that they are invisible. At the outset of our
representation, I seized upon the details of the frisk in the police
report in large part because I could talk about them easily in legal
language. Facts that did not translate well were excluded as irrele-
vant in a way that seemed perfectly natural and appropriate to us.
Perhaps use of the translation metaphor might have alerted us
to the narrowness of our Fourth Amendment account of what hap-
pened that night and prompted us to follow up on the obvious
clues; we might have asked Johnson directly if he thought race was
an issue and, if so, in what ways. An investigation might have re-
sulted that could have produced further evidence that the troopers'
actions were racist.225 But the translation metaphor also suggests
that a more profound problem existed than attention to evidentiary
proof would solve-a problem that might explain Judge Collins's
thus omitting reference to Trooper Mraz. My new sensitivity to the racial overtones of
the case caused me to remember that the judge placed considerable emphasis at the first
hearing on that fact that Trooper Mraz was Native American. He apparently was mak-
ing the common, but erroneous, assumption that the presence of a nonwhite person
automatically purges a white-dominated enterprise of any potential racism. He further
made the mistake of equating all persons of color, ignoring the obvious fact that there
can be racism between different nonwhite groups.
223 See Hearing, supra note 32, at 28; supra text accompanying note 40.
224 See Hearing, supra note 32, at 27; supra text accompanying note 40.
225 We did file a motion seeking access to the personnel records of Kiser and Mraz
to find out if there had been any complaints or discipline. Judge Collins denied the
motion out of hand and, unfortunately, discovery rights in Michigan criminal proceed-
ings were quite limited. But we could have taken other steps (e.g., trying to find former
black employees of the state patrol troop who might have confided in us, talking with
public defenders or local community leaders who might know the troopers' reputation,
and seeking records under the state freedom of information act).
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vigorous rejection of a claim of racism and our client's failure to
raise the claim with us.
Johnson might have failed to entrust us with his belief that what
happened that night was a "racial incident," because he anticipated
the same skepticism from us that his assertion received from the
troopers and Judge Collins. When a white person hears a black per-
son use a word like "racist," the response is often a strong defensive
reaction that implicitly says to the black person, "prove it!" And the
standards of proof are those white people are comfortable with: evi-
dence of conscious racial animus, intent to harm and degrade.
The possibility of such narrow meaning for the word "racist"
has caused some scholars to introduce a new word, "racialist," to
describe judgments and actions controlled by racial stereotypes
without adopting an accusatory tone.226 Peggy Davis explains how
racial stereotypes produce countless acts of "microaggression" by
whites against blacks under circumstances where whites will vigor-
ously deny the influence of race:
[Microagressions] "are subtle, stunning, often automatic, and
non-verbal exchanges which are 'put downs' of blacks by offend-
ers." Psychiatrists who have studied black populations view them
as "incessant and cumulative" assaults on black self-esteem....
Management of these assaults is a preoccupying activity, simulta-
neously necessary to and disruptive of black adaptation.... The
microaggressive acts that characterize interracial encounters are
carried out in "automatic, preconscious, or unconscious fashion"
and "stem from the mental attitude of presumed superiority. ' 2 27
Because racial prejudice is now widely treated as socially unaccept-
able, whites are motivated to deny that they are influenced by racial
feelings. As a result, "Anti-black attitudes persist in a climate of de-
nial. The denial and the persistence are related. It is difficult to
change an attitude that is unacknowledged. ' 228 Kiser's disrespect-
ful, swaggering attitude reported by Johnson can be seen as just
such an example of microaggression and Kiser's insistence that he
"treats everybody that way" part of the same system of behavior.229
226 See, e.g., Peggy C. Davis, Law as Microagression, 98 YALE LJ. 1559, 1579 (1989).
She attributes invention of the term to Stephen Carter, id. at 1570 n.51; see Stephen L.
Carter, When Victims Happen to Be Black, 97 YALE LJ. 420, 443 (1988).
227 Davis, supra note 226, at 1565, 1566 (citations omitted).
228 Id. at 1565.
229 When Patricia Williams, see supra notes 216-20 and accompanying text, and infra
note 237, read a draft of this article, she told me that she was particularly offended by
Kiser's use of the word "everybody." Placing herself in Johnson's place, she resisted
Kiser's assumed authority to include her in a single, undifferentiated mass of people
defined by him. Presumably "everybody" to Kiser was everyone he deals with as a police
officer regardless of race, gender, age, or class. (Angela Harris lodged a similar objec-
tion against the presumptive assertion by the white male authors of the Declaration of
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At the conclusion of one of my presentations of this article in
draft form, a white person attending the presentation identified
himself as a former police officer (and prosecutor) who now was a
lawyer in private practice (and who did substantial criminal defense
work). He said that our client's effort to receive courteous answers
from the police officers was doomed to failure because the police
are trained from the academy to take command of situations like the
one that night. By issuing only orders, not answers, the police of-
ficer creates a show of authority that prevents resort to potentially
deadly force by either suspect or officer. From this perspective, the
troopers conduct was simply sound, standard operating
procedure. 23 0
But what happens when the "everybody" subjected to this stan-
dard procedure is differentiated by race? Davis tells us that the most
potent form of microaggression is the long-established American
color-caste behavior described as "deference" by scholars of racism
more than fifty years ago:
The most striking form of. . . "caste behavior" is deference, the
respectful yielding exhibited by the Negroes in their contacts with
whites. According to the dogma, and to a large extent actually,
the behavior of both Negroes and white people must be such as to
indicate that the two are socially distinct and that the Negro is
subordinate.231
Derrick Bell made the point more succinctly when he used the key
phrase, "uppity nigger," to tell me what the Johnson case was "re-
ally" about.23 2
Independence when they begin the document with the words "We the People." Angela
P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581, 582 (1990)).
The problem is not just that Kiser might in fact not treat everybody the same by the
standard of observable behavior, but that white and black Americans are not the same
"everybody." AsJohnson reported saying to Kiser that night, Kiser probably would not
have approached a white, apparently middle-class suburbanite, with the opening phrase,
"Hey yo," but even if he addressed all stopped motorists that way, the impact might be
different on black persons. Williams saw in the "Hey, yo" expression a deliberate carica-
ture of what a white person understands to be black dialect, a form of microaggression
she encounters frequently.
230 For an eloquent response to this point, see Early, supra note 215.
231 Davis, supra note 227, at 1567 (quoting ALLISON DAVIS ET AL., DEEP Soutns 22-23
(1941); see also Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 14, at 1288 ("Racism ... is ritual asser-
tion of supremacy .... It is performed largely unconsciously .... Racism seems right,
customary and inoffensive to those engaged in it .... ").
232 See supra text accompanying note 194. In 1990 the Massachusetts Attorney Gen-
eral issued a report on practices of the Boston Police Department in response to com-
plaints of racism. Among the many incidents catalogued in that report are the following
that parallel the Johnson case:
[A] black male taxicab driver was driving home in his own car when a
police cruiser pulled him over and frisked him. When the taxicab driver
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James Boyd White, in commenting on the way that the Robinson
decision treated the arrested suspect as an object "belonging to the
police" rather than as a person with a voice, 233 has said that it re-
minds him of the way the Supreme Court in the Dred Scott case 234
denied Scott the right to speak in court as a plaintiff by turning him
into a piece of property, and of the way the 1850 Fugitive Slave
Act 23 5 prohibited an alleged slave from testifying in the very pro-
ceeding intended to determine whether the person was indeed a
slave.2 36 It seems obvious that there is a difference between treating
a black American as if he were property and treating a white Ameri-
can in "the same way." But how does one make this point in legal
language? 23 7 In Fourth Amendment terms, Johnson was simply
"Everyman"; his Fourth Amendment rights were supposedly no
greater nor less because he was black. But what if the whole world
created by our current Fourth Amendment language was inherently
racist? Does the language of Robinson become racist whenever it is
spoken by a white officer to a black citizen, creating a vicious cycle
seeming to lead inevitably to the consequences suffered by Dujon
Johnson?238
asked why, he was arrested for disorderly conduct. The charge was even-
tually dismissed.
A 20 year-old black man reported that . . . two police officers ap-
proached him while he was parked outside a local high school waiting to
pick up a friend. The officers searched his car. When he asked a question
he was told to "shut the fuck up."
A 30 year-old black man ... was stopped while driving in Boston with a
friend. An officer told him, " 'Get out of the motherfucking jeep and
don't let me have to tell you twice.' When the [man] said, 'Excuse me?',
the officer reportedly responded, 'Oh, you're a fucking tough guy. Give
me your registration.' The [man] was taken from the jeep, handcuffed,
and placed in the police cruiser.
Report of the Attorney General's Civil Rights Division on Boston Police Department
Practices (Dec. 18, 1990) at 21, 22, 23, quoted in Tracey Maclin, Black and Blue En-
counters:-Some Preliminary Thoughts About Fourth Amendment Seizures: Should Race Matter?, 26
VAL. L. REV. 243, 251-52 (1991).
233 WHITE, JUSTICE AS TRANSLATION, supra note 65, at 195.
234 Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
235 Federal Fugitive Slave Act, Ch. 60, Sec. 6, 9 Stat. 462, 463 (1850) ("In no trial or
hearing under this act shall the testimony of such alleged fugitive be admitted into evi-
dence .... ").
236 WHITE, supra note 65, at 195.
237 See Patricia Williams' meditation on this point. PATRICIA WILLIAMS, On Being
Property, in WILLIAMS, supra note 216, at 216.
238 [The police officers] are especially interested in cars with two or more
young black males....
A curious thing happens when some cars are stopped. Without be-
ing asked, some of the male occupants get out, unhitch their belt buckles
and place their hands on the roof of the car-a frisk procedure they've
obviously been through before.
McGuire, supra note 208, at ID.
In their own eyes, officers stop no one except for good cause. They ex-
pect detainees to recognize that they have been detained for good reason
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Was the context that made my client's experience understand-
able as a "racial incident" as invisible to me, the student attorneys,
and the white judge as the air we breathed? How then could I un-
derstand Johnson well enough to even attempt to translate his story
to other white Americans? What in my own experience could I pos-
sibly draw upon? Many times I approached this question in writing
this Article: my fingers grew still on the computer keyboard, and I
eventually moved to a different part of the Article. But in reviewing
my notes of that painful meeting with Johnson on the day the case
was dismissed I may have found a possible bridge: my own experi-
ence of representing Dujon Johnson.
This idea was not my own; Johnson himself suggested it. John-
son made an explicit analogy between the way we treated him and
the way he was treated by Trooper Kiser. He said, "The way you
guys talk to me and approach me-it's a little like the way Trooper
Kiser approached me." At the time and for months thereafter I did
not think about those comments, perhaps because I did not under-
stand them, perhaps because it was too painful to try and under-
stand them.
The most obvious common element between our representa-
tion and Johnson's treatment at the hands of Trooper Kiser seemed
to be that he did not feel he was treated as an adult.239 More subtle
was the similarity between our reaction to what Johnson was saying
and the reaction he received from Trooper Kiser andJudge Collins.
Naturally, we were defensive, saying that we certainly did not intend
to treat him differently or like a child. The students went further
and asserted confidently that they would not have treated him any
differently if he were white-that if they had been rude or impatient,
it was just their personalities, not him. Only when I was deep into
writing this article did I notice the uncanny way that this interchange
echoed the end of the story Johnson told during the initial
interview:
I told him [Trooper Kiser] that... I didn't appreciate you treating
me like I was a sixteen-year old kid, which obviously I am not. He
and to defer politely to authority. However, based on their prejudices,
police officers are more likely to stop minorities, and minorities are less
likely to respond with deference because of their hostility toward police.
An officer will view lack of cooperation as an indication of guilt, thereby
justifying an arrest.
Stormer & Bernstein, supra note 207, at 117.
239 Compare Johnson's post-dismissal statement that during our representation he
felt that he was not an adult, supra p. 1329, with his comment to Trooper Kiser that he
did not appreciate being treated like a sixteen-year old, infra text accompanying note
240.
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claims ... then that "I treat everybody like that." "Well I don't
think you do, personally." 240
Perhaps Johnson realized the risk that, like Trooper Kiser and
Judge Collins, we might interpret his complaints about being
treated differently as a strong accusation of being racist, "racist" as
the word is understood by white Americans. Recognizing the gap,
he told us, "I never said you were racist." Instead, he urged us to
admit that we were different from him241 and therefore were neces-
sarily going to treat him differently. He asked that we be sensitive to
the differences and adjust what we said and did accordingly.2 42
What he said was something very close to the following words:
What's wrong with realizing that different people have different
needs? You wouldn't say "Hi" to someone you know doesn't
speak English. You wouldn't say, "let's run over to the store," to
someone who doesn't have legs. If both parties are making an
effort, there eventually will be a consensus about how to deal with
the solution, about how to communicate.
Rereading these words in my notes, it finally, belatedly oc-
curred to me that at that last meeting, it was perhaps our client who
was the translator, not us. He was right: by being trapped in my
assurance as a lawyer and professor that I knew the answers, I could
not be a student, could not learn. Perhaps only if the humiliation of
that encounter matures into some humility can I begin to appreciate
our client's skill and sensitivity in trying to bridge a terrible gap.
I originally ended this Article here by quoting Patricia Wil-
liams's description of the dilemma she feels in her separation from
white Americans: "[the distance] is marked by an emptiness in my-
self, ... [which] is reiterated by a hole in language, by a gap in the
law .... "243 Williams goes on, though, to move from this sense of
emptiness to conclude in hope that we can achieve a nonracist sensi-
bility through the hard work of boundary-crossing in which a person
somehow can see multiple perspectives simultaneously. 244 In that
earlier draft I concluded with regret that I could not move further
because Dujon Johnson was no longer my client and, therefore, I
could not ask him to express in his own language his understanding
of how what happened was a "racial incident." Nor could I collabo-
rate with him in reworking my legal language to express that
understanding.
240 Initial Interview, supra note 44.
241 Some of the comments printed supra pp. 1329-30 were made in this context.
242 At one point he said, "I'm not sure you guys are as careful about what you say as
I am."
243 Patricia T. Williams, The Obliging Shell: An Informal Essay on Formal Equal Opportu-
nity, 87 MIcH. L. REv. 2128, 2151 (1989).
244 Id.; cf Delgado, Storytelling, supra note 14; Matsuda, supra note 14.
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However, as I mentioned above, through no virtue of my own,
Dujon Johnson contacted me during the late spring of 1991 on his
own initiative and has since reviewed this Article and provided his
own comments. I therefore conclude differently, by relating the dia-
logue between us, striving to make the last words of this Article not
only mine but also those of Dujon Johnson.
V
LAST WORDS
In May 1991 I unexpectedly received a letter from DujonJohn-
son which read in part as follows:
Dear Clark,
It has been quite some time since I've been in contact with
you (July 3rd, 1989), and I thought I would drop you a short letter
to say all is well.... I appreciate all that you did for me concern-
ing my experience with the Michigan State Troopers. I can only
wonder what might have happened without your (and the Univ. of
Michigan Legal Clinic) assistance. Did you ever write the article
concerning lawyer-client relationships for a law review? If so, I
would like to read it....
I wrote back, enclosing the then-current draft of this Article
(which did not include Parts II and III), along with a letter asking for
his comments in general and responses to a number of specific
questions. He responded, first with a telephone call, and then with a
detailed letter.
The first of several surprises I experienced came in his response
to this question:
Although I recall your giving me permission to write about your
case, in the more recent drafts of the Article I have used fictional
names because of concern that I may be revealing more private
information than you would be comfortable with. In some ways I
regret this change, because it diminishes the "true story" force of
the narrative. Please let me know whether you would like to be
identified or want me to continue to use fictional names.
When Johnson called me, he said not only did I have his permission
to use his real name, he insisted that I do so. He said: 24 5
If my name is not used I would be a non-person again. [During
the case] I was talked over; I was talked through. [In the version
of the Article sent to him] I still don't exist. I want to be identi-
245 I am relying on almost verbatim notes taken during the telephone conversation.
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fled. This anonymity has to end somewhere; I was anonymous in
the courtroom. 24 6
In what I thought might have been an excess of concern for John-
son's feelings and for the confidentiality of his communications, I
had replaced his real name (and the names of the locations and
other actors) with pseudonyms. It had never occurred to me (nor
do I think would it occur to most attorneys) that my client might be
upset by this removal of his identity from a recounting of "his"
case-a striking example of apparent paternalism operating below
the threshold of awareness.
I will present Johnson's other comments by alternating excerpts
from my questions with an edited version of his written responses.
Cunningham
I leave out of the article the fact that you did not, in fact, prepare
to cross-examine Kiser.24 7 My recollection is that your car broke
down on the day you planned to come to Ann Arbor to prepare.
What, if anything, would you like me to say about this fact? What
other reasons, if any, were there for the failure of our plan to have
you share in the trial? What could have been done differently to
make the plan work? (One obvious possibility is that we could
have come to Detroit to work on the preparation.)
Johnson
I believe that the strategy to cross-examine Kiser was planned, not
the content itself. We did not develop it further than talking strat-
egy. I would have, and could have prepared to cross-examine Ki-
ser. I believe that counsel waited too far into the legal process to
allow me to become involved, thus any attempts to involve me
seriously into my case (with my personal responsibilities in mind)
would have been rushing it too fast. I do, however, agree that
some attempt to work with me in Detroit could not only have been
more convenient, but would have shown me that my counsel un-
derstood the economical, social constraints that I felt I had in
dealing with the legal system. The failure of my student-attorneys
and yourself to make such an attempt showed me that it was too
inconvenient (or unimportant) to leave the ivory tower(s) of Ann
Arbor. No one really asked me what I wanted or how I wanted to
proceed until long after (and in some cases after) the legal pro-
ceedings were underway.
246 Johnson's seemingly effortless skill at metaphoric extension of key words is dis-
played in these comments; the transition from the anonymity of "the client" in the ear-
lier draft of this article to his anonymity in the case is apt and powerful.
247 I also omitted what may seem to some readers this important fact from the case
narrative in Part I because I wanted it to be interpreted at this point, in the context of
Johnson's comment.
1384 [Vol. 77:1298
LAWYER AS TRANSLATOR
Cunningham
Have I done a fair job of presenting what you said to us after the
case was dismissed? Have I left out important things that were
said? Are there thoughts and feelings you remember from that
meeting that you did not express that you would like me to know
about now?
Johnson
More or less. What I said, or meant to imply is that as white edu-
cated men (or as two law students), the three of you would never
have to worry about finding employment or about providing for
your families. This society is geared toward and protected by
white men. No matter what the outcome of my case, no one's life
would be changed. In fact, in a matter of time this would be for-
gotten by the attorneys themselves. I dealt with a situation which
probably led to me losing my job at the University of Michigan,
the loss of respect and dignity in my arrest, and now I was
threatened with the very real and near prospect of being con-
victed. The very fact that I was involved in the legal proceedings,
as I saw it, was a presumption of guilt (I have the two require-
ments: I was a person of color, and I didn't know my place.) This
then was a fight of survival for whatever control I had left. How
can I not have control of my life and still have goals, dreams, and
ambitions? How could I be a husband? And father? How would
my wife view me? Yes, these were things that were pressing
against my mind when I referred to control over one's life. I felt
very emasculated, less than a man.
Cunningham
Am I right in thinking that you did not tell us in our various meet-
ings that you thought you were stopped because you were black?
If you did tell us, can you remember when and how you told us
and what our reaction was? If you did not tell us, did you think
nonetheless that Kiser's actions were racially motivated? If you
thought so, why did you not say so explicitly to us? (I have some
guesses as to the answer to the last question, but would prefer to
hear from you.)
Johnson
I did not tell you it was a racial issue, although I knew from the
very beginning that it was (my arrest) racially motivated. I would
have confided this, but who would have believed me anyway? I
felt that on the basis of law itself that I did not have to interject the
aspect of racial bias. I knew, legally, that Kiser's actions were
wrong. And I felt I had taken the higher moral and legal
ground.248
248 My biggest surprise was learning that Johnson had made a deliberate choice to
exclude the issue of race from his defense of the misdemeanor charge. As he further
explained to me in his telephone call and at our subsequent meeting in Iowa City, he did
not want to interject the issue of racial bias because he "didn't want to cloud the legal
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Cunningham
I would like to hear more specifically what happened when you
tried to pursue your complaint against Kiser.
Johnson
Basically, I was told that there wasn't any substantial damage
physically, and despite a clear violation of rights, it wasn't worth
their time to pursue without a substantial monetary deposit.2 4 9
Cunningham
Most importantly, how could we have represented you better?
Some who have read the draft article have suggested that my
translation metaphor misses the key point, which is that the judge
(and jury) needed to hear and understand your story told in your
own voice and words. In other words, you didn't need a "lawyer-
translator." Other readers say that the inherent flaws of the legal
system made it impossible for you to get any meaningful relief
(i.e. the restoration of dignity that you wanted) and that we should
have told you so. Or do you think it is possible that you and we
could have collaborated together and produced a better transla-
tion of what happened, one that made sense to you and was effec-
tive in the courtroom?
Johnson
I agree with your two stated points, although I would argue that
the "untrained" needs a "lawyer-translator" to some degree.2 50 I
do believe some type of collaboration would have been most ef-
fective for the officers involved and for the court as well, if indeed
the court wanted to be educated.
issues. I felt that I had enough rights in the legal realm to go on; there was a sound legal
basis for what I did." Thus while I was berating myself in Part IV, see supra pp. 1377-83,
for being insensitive to the racial issues inherent in the arrest or for failing to gain suffi-
cient trust from my client so that he could confide "the real issue," I failed to consider
that his seemingly strange omission of the claim "I was stopped because I was black"
might be his own strategic construction of the case that he expected us to honor. A
similar point was made when Johnson explained that his comments on the day of the
dismissal (that I had a "guardian mentality," assumed I knew the needs and answers,
and was oversensitive and patronizing, see supra p. 1330), were directed in large part to
my efforts in that meeting to point out to the student attorneys that our representation
of Johnson might have been tainted by our own racism even though Johnson himself
had not gone so far as to say so. He told me: "That which has not been said, hasn't
been said; that would indicate I didn't want to say it."
249 Johnson told me that one lawyer he contacted wanted $2000 up front and that
the AGLU never got back to him.
250 In conversation, Johnson elaborated:
I didn't see you as a translator; in order for me to get even the appear-
ance of my day in court, I needed you guys. The judge wasn't interested
in a translation of what I had to say; he was interested simply in justifying
the actions of the troopers. You are assuming that the judge-the sys-
tem-was interested in a translation.
[Vol. 77:12981386
LA WYER AS TRANSLATOR
Johnson concluded his letter with these words:
[M]y deepest regret [is] that the judge assumed he knew how I was
as an individual, and, on this assumption, he judged me on what
he believed and not on what was said by me, my counsel, or even
on what he saw (other than my race). To be voiceless was the
greatest pain of all. What struck me most about the judge is that
he seemed so compassionate [to other parties in other cases I ob-
served] in the 10 months or so that I came to the courthouse wait-
ing for hearing after hearing to be rescheduled. I never saw this
compassion, I never received the "I have been there before, I can
relate" talks that he frequently gave to those who came before
him. I suddenly and unconsciously realized why.
Before I received DujonJohnson's letter in May 1991, my draft
of this Article ended with these words that he said to us on the day
his case was dismissed:
You guys can afford to examine yourselves. I can't. I'm on the
threshold of existence. There's no safety net. You guys know you
won't be walking the streets tomorrow. I can't know that. The
moment you guys drop me off, I need to start thinking about
where the next month's rent is coming from. Most of the time I
don't come into contact with guys like you. We don't walk in the
same streets.
In that earlier draft I wrote that I was haunted by these words. I still
am. But I want to add to them the concluding sentences of Dujon
Johnson's May 1991 letter:
In closing, I did attempt to, two years ago, pursue my complaint
against Officer Kiser's conduct, but no attorney or legal organiza-
tion considered it worth their while without a considerable mone-
tary sum up front. I guess laws are for those who can afford it. But
I consider it a valuable experience and a lesson learned. I wish
you continued peace.
Sincerely,
M. Dujon Johnson
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